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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Adolf Hitler almost won World War II.  Hitler – the Bohemian corporal, the anti-
Semite, the Megalomaniac – almost conquered Europe.  By 1941, the British remained 
alone in the war against the Axis powers.1  The British military most likely would not 
have defeated the Germans single-handedly.  Likewise, the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union began with a string of military successes.  However, the American entry 
into the war in December 1941 and Hitler’s questionable decisions in Operation 
Barbarossa turned the tide of the war in favor of the Allies.  By 1942, the Allies put the 
Wehrmacht on the defensive.  In November 1942, General Bernard Montgomery and the 
British tank division broke the joint German and Italian line at El Alamein, Egypt.2  In 
July 1943, British and American troops crossed the Mediterranean and successfully 
landed in Sicily.3  Despite months of staunch German resistance, the Allied forces 
entered Rome on June 4, 1944, ushering in the collapse of Fascist Italy.4 
 On the Eastern Front, Hitler’s forces in Ukraine marched on Moscow during the 
summer of 1942.5  In July, Hitler split his forces, sending troops south to capture 
Stalingrad and disrupt the Soviet Union’s oil resources.6  By September, Hitler’s forces 
entered Stalingrad.7  However, while the Wehrmacht fought building to building for 
control of Stalingrad, Soviet reinforcements surrounded the city.  In November, the Red 
Army closed the vice around Stalingrad and trapped the Sixth Army within the city.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War (Harper Collins: 1968), 167. 
2 Wright, Total War, 182. 
3 Wright, Total War, 190. 
4 Wright, Total War, 193. 
5 Wright, Total War, 187. 
6 Wright, Total War, 187. 
7 Wright, Total War, 187. 
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Enormous losses forced General Friedrich von Paulus to defy Hitler’s orders and 
surrender in February 1943.  Finally, on June 6, 1944, the British and Americans opened 
the Western Front with their successful landing in Normandy. 
 Indeed, the Nazi Germany’s situation became desperate as the Allies closed in on 
Berlin.  Hitler truly believed that he needed to fulfill his messianic mission and subjugate 
Europe for the ascendancy of the “Aryan” race.  In the final stages of the war, the 
German dictator did not hesitate to take risks in a last ditch effort to check the Allied 
advance.  For example, in January 1945, Hitler launched the surprise Ardennes Offensive 
in an attempt to capture Antwerp, a major Allied supply port.8  Limited success came at 
the expense of one hundred thousand men.  The German dictator also considered 
organizing “suicide squads” similar to that of Japanese kamikaze pilots.9  Hitler allocated 
a lot of resources to his  “secret weapons” projects, among them chemical weapons.  He 
also possessed the technology to disperse his poison gas over London with V-2 rockets.  
Based on his wartime decisions, the absence of chemical warfare remains a puzzle. 
 Clearly, morality did not prevent Hitler from using the asphyxiating gas Zyklon-B 
in the chambers of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and other killing centers.  Likewise, on the 
battlefield, the German dictator conducted the war and perpetrated terror without any 
limits.  For example, Hitler’s blitzkrieg tactics in Poland in September 1939 pulverized 
Polish defenses and, more significantly, broke down the enemy’s will to resist.10  The 
German Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber had sirens attached its the wings and on the tails of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Wright, Total War, 201. 
9 Speer, Third Reich, 412. 
10 Oscar Pinkus, The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler (MacFarland & Co, Inc.: 
2005), 73. 
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bombs.11  The bomber’s plunge made shrieks designed to cause fear, panic, and 
confusion.12  During the blitzkrieg of Poland, the Luftwaffe bombed towns, villages, and 
refugee columns.13  The German air force lay waste to Warsaw with five days of 
indiscriminate bombing, specifically targeting residential areas, and resulted in the deaths 
of 40,000 Polish civilians.14 
 Hitler also issued the Kommissarbefehl (“commissar order”) in March 1941, 
which denied any Communist officials in the military or civil administration prisoner of 
war (POW) status and ordered their immediate execution.15  Similarly, the “Barbarossa 
Decree” approved collective reprisal against entire villages.16  Hitler also emphasized the 
brutalization of Russian POWs.  By war’s end, the Wehrmacht captured 5.73 million 
Russian soldiers.17  Once captured, thousands were executed on the spot.18  German 
soldiers did not tend to the wounded and force-marched hundreds of thousands of POWs 
for weeks without food, water, or rest.19  Over the course of the war, 3.5 millions Russian 
POWs perished from execution, starvation, thirst, or sickness.20  Russian soldiers were 
subject to brandings and sent to clear minefields.  During the Soviet westward advance, 
Russian POWs were gassed to prevent them from returning to the Red Army.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pinkus, War Aims, 74. 
12 Pinkus, War Aims, 74. 
13 Pinkus, War Aims, 74. 
14 Pinkus, War Aims, 75. 
15 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland (Harper Collins: 1992), 22. 
16 Browning, Ordinary Men, 22. 
17 Pinkus, War Aims, 271. 
18 Pinkus, War Aims, 271. 
19 Pinkus, War Aims, 272.  
20 Pinkus, War Aims, 274. 
21 Pinkus, War Aims, 274. 
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 World War II can be viewed in three separate phases: 1939-1941, 1942-1943, and 
1944-1945.  During the first phase of the war, Hitler did not require chemical weapons.  
He was winning and almost conquered Europe if not for his failure to invade Britain and 
his stubborn desire to subjugate the Soviet Union.  However, during the second phase, the 
war took a decisive turn against the Third Reich.  Then, during the third phase of the war, 
desperation set in as the Allies closed in around Berlin.  Hitler began to mentally unravel 
in January 1945 and became suicidal.  His scorched-earth policies reflected these trends.  
Hitler continued to assert near the end of the war that “we will not capitulate […;] we can 
go down, but we’ll take the world with us.”22  Armaments Minster Albert Speer even 
recognized that Hitler grew “more and more ruthlessly determined to bring on total 
catastrophe.”23  Clearly, Hitler refused to surrender and was determined to fight down to 
the last German standing.  Judging by Hitler’s conduct of the war and his mental state, 
Hitler should have deployed chemical weapons at some point, especially during the third 
phase of the war.  However, the German dictator did not initiate chemical warfare. 
 Ultimately, Hitler intended to deploy his chemical weapons during World War II.  
However, two men, in particular, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and architect 
turned Armaments Minister Albert Speer, thwarted Hitler’s designs.  In May 1942, 
Churchill threatened mass retaliation against Germany if Hitler initiated chemical warfare 
against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front.  In the spring of 1945, Speer defied 
Hitler’s direct orders and challenged Hitler’s suicidal policies.  This thesis will explore 
and discuss Hitler’s worldview and policies; Churchill’s threats of mass retaliation; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Pinkus, War Aims, 471. 
23 Speer, Third Reich, 401. 
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Speer’s acts of defiance.  Many questions surrounding the use of chemical weapons 
during World War II still exist.  This analysis will fill the gaps in the historical narrative, 
thereby contributing to a more nuanced understanding of Hitler’s policies during World 
War II. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HITLER’S WORLDVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 Before analyzing Hitler’s chemical weapons policies and decision-making process 
during World War II, the reader must possess a more nuanced understanding of the man, 
his worldview, and his goals.  Therefore, this chapter addresses the essential questions 
surrounding Hitler’s political persona and agenda.  It will also provide the reader with an 
in-depth knowledge of Hitler’s philosophical, historical, and pseudo-scientific 
justifications for the atrocities subsequently committed by the Nazi regime.  Tracing 
Hitler’s life, from his childhood through World War II, this chapter examines the 
development of his beliefs and his influence on the National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party (NSDAP), on the country as a whole, and on international relations leading to 
World War II.  The evils that Hitler and the Nazi regime perpetrated were inexcusable 
and to a certain extent, incomprehensible.  However, in many ways, Hitler’s worldview 
was not an anomaly, but rather a product of an era of turmoil.  He merely possessed the 
political acumen to translate his ideals and goals into reality.  Hitler worshipped Germany 
and idealized the “Aryan” race, and although one must approach Mein Kampf, the 
primary source of material for this chapter, with certain skepticism since the work was 
propagandistic, one can neither deny Hitler’s unceasing passion for the advancement and 
security of the German nation, nor the vehemence of his hatred of the people he 
considered undesirable.  Hitler was a complicated individual capable of sanctioning the 
perpetration of terrible crimes against humanity.  He ordered the use of chemical 
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weapons against civilian populations and POWs.  Therefore, the question remains as to 
why Hitler did not initiate chemical warfare. 
 
Hitler in his Youth 
 Born on the cusp of modernity, Adolf Hitler entered a world that changed more in 
the last twenty years than in the previous two thousand.  The fin de siècle period 
witnessed the rise of the modern west with combustion engines, industry, science, and 
chemicals.  Hitler’s generation was the first generation able to use the force of science 
and industry in warfare.  His time and experiences in Austria laid the foundation for his 
radical political, social, and racial worldviews.  Hitler was born in Linz, Austria on April 
20, 1889.  Hitler struggled in his schooling, but developed a talent for drawing.24  His 
father enjoyed a successful career as a customs agent in the civil service and expected 
Hitler to follow in his footsteps.25  Hitler had no desire to join the civil service, but 
instead longed for a career in painting.26  Following his father’s death in 1903, Hitler’s 
mother allowed Hitler to move to Vienna in 1905 to explore his artistic ambitions.  In 
Vienna, Hitler failed the exam to the Academy of Fine Arts twice, first in 1907 and then 
in 1908.  Hitler’s disappointment in his failure as an artist remained with him for the rest 
of his life.27  Hitler resorted to a “bohemian” lifestyle in Vienna, selling watercolors of 
landmarks and working at odd jobs.  In Mein Kampf, he often describes the different 
phases of his life as an eternal struggle.  Hitler depicts his mean living in Vienna as his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (W.W. Norton & Company: 1998), 10. 
25 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Stackpole Sons: 1939), 23. 
26 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 24. 
27 Kershaw, Hubris, 39. 
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first real struggle, claiming that these experiences provided him with an iron will that 
would serve him in the future.28  The question remains as to whether or not Hitler was a 
confirmed anti-Semite prior to the years spent in Vienna.  Nevertheless, Mein Kampf 
contains Hitler’s transformative stance against the Jewish population of Europe.  Hitler 
claimed that he did hold negative feelings towards Jews prior to his time in Vienna.  
However, his exposure to Marxism, Austrian Social Democracy, and the press in Vienna 
opened his eyes to the “danger” that Jews posed as the “corrupter of the German 
people.”29 
 Hitler considered the Social Democrats a “pestilence masquerading as social 
virtue and love of one’s neighbors.”30  In one of his anecdotes, Hitler illustrates his initial 
contact with Social Democrats during one of his temporary construction jobs.  When 
Hitler confronted these workers with what he considered logical and rational arguments 
that repudiated their opinions, the workers responded with threats of violence instead of 
well-reasoned rebuttals of their own.31  Hitler thus concluded that Social Democrats did 
not listen to reason or logical arguments that contradicted their beliefs, but rather simply 
argued for better or worse the force-fed propaganda.32  Individuals could hold reasonable 
views, but in masses, Hitler observed, people lost all reason – an important lesson that 
Hitler took into his future political career.33  Following this initial exposure to the Social 
Democrats, Hitler turned his attention to the party’s press and the propaganda.  Hitler 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung (Wesleyan University Press: 1972), 13. 
29 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 71. 
30 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 50. 
31 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 72. 
32 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 72. 
33 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 70. 
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described this propaganda as “intellectual terrorism.”34  The press bombarded the 
proletariat with “lies” and took advantage of the weak-minded, uneducated masses.35  
The Social Democrats wanted to keep the working class down and to use them as tools to 
further their own political ends.36  Although Hitler condemned the content of Social 
Democratic propaganda, he also learned effective techniques from their overall success.  
Hitler decried this class warfare as it distracted from the priority of ethnic solidarity.37  
The Social Democrats sought coalitions with other ethnic political parties and did not 
hold the Fatherland in the same reverence as Hitler. 38 
 Much of the first volume of Mein Kampf involves Hitler’s discovery of his 
version of truth.  Hitler attempted to find the linkages between Social Democrats, 
Marxism, and Judaism.  According to historian Ian Kershaw, Hitler “formed his newly 
found hatred into a conspiracy theory.”39  Thus, the “recognition” of the perceived Jewish 
threat fed into his revulsion of the anti-nationalism of the Social Democrats.  Hitler 
observed a cycle of unemployment that led men to convert into tools for Marxists and 
Social Democrats.40  The weakening of the economy forced men into unemployment.  
They found employment only to again lose their jobs, generating a general sense of 
despair and hopelessness at achieving success within the current state of affairs.  The 
collapse of self-will resulted in the susceptibility of the proletariat to Marxist ideology.  
Furthermore, universities under the negative influence of Jewish intellectuals did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 54. 
35 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 54. 
36 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 60. 
37 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 60. 
38 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 51. 
39 Kershaw, Hubris, 61. 
40 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 35. 
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teach Marxism, therefore people could not develop a suitable defense against its 
dangers.41  Hitler claimed that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and thus the 
progenitors of Marxist ideologies, were all Jewish.42  Marxist ideologies advocated the 
collapse of modern society.  According to Hitler, men created civilization, and without 
the strength of individual self-preservation, civilization would collapse.  Hitler theorized, 
as Marxism thrived on the backs of the defeated proletariat, the spread of Marxism 
ushered the end of civilization. 
 Because Hitler equated Marxism and the activities of the Social Democrats as the 
machinations of Jews, Hitler determined that Jews ultimately sought the collapse of 
civilization and the destruction of humanity.43  In the words of Kershaw, Hitler often 
connected Jews with a disease capable of spreading into any societal institution.44  Jews 
controlled art, the theater, the press, and all other mediums of culture and propaganda.45  
Through his experience interacting with Social Democrats and consuming their 
propaganda, Hitler drew startling conclusions.  The Jews sought the conquest and 
domination of the world by creating chaos and manipulating politics and the economy to 
serve their needs.46  Hitler actively struggled to challenge the Jewish threat at an 
individual level, but could not change the hearts and minds of people around him: “No 
matter where you seized one of these apostles, your hand grasped slimy ooze, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 169. 
42 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 71. 
43 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 169. 
44 Kershaw, Hubris, 61. 
45 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 69. 
46 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 74. 
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poured in separate streams through the fingers, only to unite again the next moment.”47  
However, from his years in Vienna, Hitler declared an eternal struggle against the Jewish 
threat to the German Fatherland: “By resisting the Jew, I am fighting for the Lord’s 
work.”48  From this early period in his life, Hitler connected this struggle to moral and 
religious justifications.  Despite the pseudo-scientific arguments in Mein Kampf and his 
expressed anti-Christian views, Hitler was surprisingly religious.49  He was a confirmed 
member of the Catholic Church and did not leave the Church.  According to psycho-
historian Robert Waite, Hitler viewed the German struggle against the Jews as the forces 
of God battling the forces of Satan.  He believed in his messianic mission and wanted to 
create a religion instead of a political movement.  Indeed, Hitler based his religious 
motifs on the Catholic Church.  Although Hitler’s views towards Jews were already 
dangerously radical by this early period in his life, his experiences in World War I only 
served to exacerbate this marked hate towards Jews. 
 Hitler matched his hate for the Jews with an equal love for Germany and the 
German people.  One possible explanation for Hitler’s fanatical Germanophilia has been 
labeled the “Borderlands syndrome.”  Philosopher Isaiah Berlin argued that those raised 
on the peripheries are more inclined towards radical nationalism than those within the 
center of the nation. During his years in Vienna, Hitler found the Austrian Germans in a 
sorry state, corrupted by the Jewish propaganda of the Social Democrats.  In Hitler’s 
words, “Pride of the Fatherland” was essentially unavailable to the masses of German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 72. 
48 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 74. 
49 Robert Waite, Psychopathic God Adolf Hitler (Basic Books: 1977), 29. 
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people.50  However, Hitler did not criticize or blame the proletarian masses for their 
apathy towards or disdain of Germany.  First, the abject conditions and trials to which 
these people were exposed distracted from nationalist sentiment.51  Second, Hitler blamed 
the lack of education of the proletariat for the absence of German nationalism.52  Because 
of the lower standards of living, schooling was unaffordable, breeding a continual cycle 
of ignorance that opened up Austrians to Jewish lies.  Hitler determined that the 
nationalization of Austrian Germans was essential.  This nationalization required creating 
positive social environments so that education could flourish.53  Clearly, Hitler advocated 
the indoctrination of the German people through education from a young age.  Hitler’s 
policies with youth organizations during the Third Reich reflected this understanding of 
the importance of education in nationalizing the people. 
 Ultimately, Hitler’s exposure to the Social Democrats in Vienna from 1905-1912 
provided the foundation for his radical political, social, and racial worldviews.  Whether 
an honest account of the development of his beliefs or an apocryphal tale justifying and 
rationalizing his ideologies, Hitler obviously connected the Social Democrats to Marxism 
to Judaism.  Apparent from his youth, Hitler’s love of Germany and the German people 
most influenced his attitude towards Social Democrats and Jews.  Hitler saw the suffering 
of his ethnic brethren under the oppression of manipulative Jews and thus developed a 
dangerous racial worldview.  However, as this chapter will continue to explore, Hitler’s 
attitudes were not unique, but rather concurrent with the times.  Nevertheless, Hitler’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 43. 
51 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 43. 
52 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 43. 
53 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 46. 
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time in Vienna morphed and radicalized his worldview.  In order to avoid conscription to 
the multiethnic Austrian military, Hitler moved to Munich in 1912.54  He then found 
himself a German resident with the outbreak of World War I. 
 
Hitler in World War I 
 Hitler’s exposure to the brutality of industrialized warfare and the utter betrayal of 
the “stab in the back myth” further transformed the righteous anger from his Vienna years 
into a more violent, more radical worldview that he carried into his political life.  
Austrian by birth, Hitler’s time in the military, bleeding and fighting for the Fatherland, 
finally solidified and cemented his desired connection to Germany.  Thus, the perceived 
Jewish betrayal at war’s end impacted his worldview at a magnitude much greater than 
his experiences with Austrian Social Democracy.  Hitler, an avid student of military 
history, feared that he lived in the wrong era, one of peace, order, and geopolitical 
security.55  Obsessed with Bismarck and the wars of German Unification like the 1871 
Franco-Prussian War, he sought a conflict of immense proportions for his opportunity to 
secure his place in the annals of German history.56  Hitler professed his love of the 
German Empire and the German people; however, he also yearned for the opportunity to 
prove this intense commitment through sacrifice and heroic deeds for the sake of his 
adopted homeland.57  When Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, Hitler 
approached the prospect of imminent conflict with a high level of enthusiasm.  Following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 130. 
55 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 160. 
56 Waite, Psychopathic God, 258. 
57 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 164. 
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the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Hitler volunteered for a Bavarian regiment 
under the command of the Reichswehr.  As with much of Hitler’s personal and political 
development, this cavalier attitude toward active combat and desire for war was not 
unique to Hitler.  Extreme nationalism, the zeitgeist (spirit of the times) of the early 
twentieth century, engulfed Europe, creating an atmosphere ripe for conflict.  Apparent 
through his fascination with the Franco-Prussian War, Hitler possessed a romanticized 
conception of war.  However, like Hitler, many servicemen expected a quick campaign 
and approached the conflict with a degree of overconfidence.  During his basic training, 
Hitler expressed concern that his regiment would not arrive at the Western Front prior to 
the conclusion of the war.58  He recounted that “With love of Fatherland in its heart and 
song on its lips our young regiment had gone to battle as if to the dance.”59  Hitler 
seemed to revel in the sacrifice of young men for the country, as the highest of honors 
citing “faithfulness and obedience unto death.”  Hitler’s final war experience came as the 
result of a mustard gas attack in 1918, causing him to endure temporary blindness.60  He 
described the ordeal of suffering through the temporary blindness at some length, 
suggesting that this gas attack held some significance in his early life.61  Perhaps, this 
experience affected Hitler’s decision not to deploy chemical weapons when faced with 
the prospect of retaliation by Winston Churchill.  Thus, World War I ended in 1918 while 
Hitler was in the hospital recovering from his being gassed. 
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 According to psycho-historian Robert Waite, Hitler believed that the military was 
where he belonged.62  For the first time in his life, he experienced purpose and power as a 
piece of the “war machine in the history of the world.”  Hitler’s superiors considered him 
an exemplary and courageous soldier.63  However, the future dictator rarely mingled with 
the other soldiers.  In fact, he often criticized his fellow soldiers for their lack of 
patriotism and discipline.  Germany’s defeat was very personal to Hitler because it 
destroyed the one place where he belonged, despite his isolation.64  Hitler was a warrior 
of history, and the Jews that stabbed Germany in the back stole this opportunity from 
him.  Prior to his war experience, the Jewish threat was more intellectual in nature, but 
the violation of his sacred space introduced a violent, personal hate towards Jews.  
According to psycho-historian Rudolph Binion, the ranking military psychologist 
Edmund Forster believed that Hitler’s blindness was psychosomatic and not caused by 
the chemical gas.65  Binion argued that Hitler never accepted that the war was lost, and 
thus, Hitler connected gas to the trauma of Germany’s surrender.  Indeed, Binion tied the 
immense radicalization of Hitler’s worldview post-World War I to the trauma and 
personal nature of the involvement of Jews in the German defeat.66 
 The future party leader utilized the “stab in the back” myth to galvanize support 
for the NSDAP in the Weimar Republic.  Therefore, his vehement angst concerning 
Germany’s surrender at the end of World War I could merely have served as a political 
tool.  However, Hitler adored the military: 	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Though tens of centuries may pass, no one shall speak of heroism without 
mentioning the German Army in the World War.  Through the veil of the 
past the iron front of the grey steel helmet will appear, unswerving and 
unyielding, a monument of immortality.  So long as there are Germans 
they will remember that once these were sons of their people.67 
 
Hitler’s time as a soldier held special meaning to him.68  He maintained that the army was 
the institution closest to his heart.69  Hitler also claimed that the German military in 
World War I was the greatest force the world had ever seen, and the cause of the German 
collapse was no fault of the military since it was not defeated.70  Indeed, in Mein Kampf, 
he directed the blame to the civilians on the home front: 
Firstly, what was the army still fighting for, if people at home did not even 
want a victory? For whom the enormous sacrifices and privations? The 
soldier is sent out to fight for victory, and at home they strike against it.71 
 
Clearly, Hitler paid special devotion to the military and the sacrifices of soldiers during 
the war.  Therefore, it appears that he sincerely felt the psychic blow of the sudden 
German surrender and subscribed to the “stab in the back” myth. 
 According to Hitler, liars and criminals also influenced the end of the war and the 
abdication of the Kaiser.  Marxists, Social Democrats, and Jews stabbed Germany in the 
back.72  He argued that the German governmental bureaucracy was filled with Jews 
during the war, and added that the Jews thrived financially while the rest of the general 
populace faced privation. 73  Furthermore, he claimed that there were very few Jews on 
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the front.  In fact, they (Jews), like many people in Germany, were very patriotic and 
were over-represented in terms of medals and casualties.  Jews, he argued, also tried to 
take over the national economy during the war through their corporations by centralizing 
production.74  However, Walther Rathenau, for example, the rations minister during 
World War I was a German-Jew and extended the war through his savvy management of 
resources on the domestic front.  He, like many German-Jews, was completely committed 
to the war effort.  Nevertheless, Hitler claimed that through the manipulation of political 
and economic power, Jews, under the cover of the Social Democrats, orchestrated the fall 
of Germany at the end of World War I.  Indeed, this experience and “awareness” of the 
crimes of the Jews against the German people motivated Hitler to pursue a career in 
politics.  During the Second World War, Hitler murdered millions of Jews with chemical 
gas in the chambers of the death camps.  His hatred toward Jews continued to radicalize 
throughout his political career and into World War II.  However, chemical warfare was 
absent militarily.  Perhaps Hitler’s own experience with chemical gas so drastically 
traumatized him that he refrained from deploying chemical weapons. 
 
Hitler in the Weimar Republic 
 During the Weimar Republic, Hitler rose to political prominence within the 
NSDAP and then within the Weimar government by tapping into the increasing 
radicalization of the German people in the aftermath of World War I.  Economic and 
political stability shifted the populace to the far left and to the far right.  The foundations 
of the Nazi party fed on the ideologies of the far right.  Through his magnetic charisma 	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and emotional speeches, Hitler found willing ears of people weary of instability, suffering 
from hardship, and no longer interested in the compromises of the Weimar government.  
Following the Revolution of 1918, the Social Democrats led the way in establishing the 
Weimar Republic.  Hitler argued that President Ebert and his cronies were willing to let 
Germany and its people deteriorate for their own ambitions.75  Hitler remained in the 
military until 1919.  Immediately following the end of the war, he served two functions in 
the army.  He worked as an “education” officer and as an intelligence officer.  More 
specifically, Hitler was assigned to reintroduce discipline and nationalist sentiment within 
his Munich regiment following the revolution.76  This episode provided Hitler with the 
opportunity to speak in front of sizable audiences, and Hitler discovered his talent for 
speaking.  World War I had radicalized many Germans, as seen with the dramatic shift 
away from the center towards the far left and far right.  Historian Ian Kershaw argued 
that Hitler was not an anomaly with regards to the general trend in German political 
ideologies of the time.77  In fact, there were seventy-three nationalist parties in Germany 
when Hitler joined the DAP.  As an intelligence officer, Hitler received orders to 
investigate and infiltrate the meetings of the German Workers’ Party (DAP).78  During 
his investigations, Hitler gravitated to the anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, anti-Capitalist, and 
nationalistic ideas exchanged during party meetings.  During one such meeting, Hitler 
contributed to the conversations.  Hitler then received an invitation to join the party due 
to the impression he left on several leaders of the DAP.  Hitler claims that he was hesitant 
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at first to join the DAP because his initial plan was to establish his own political party.79   
Furthermore, the DAP was small, localized, and unorganized.80  Hitler ultimately decided 
to become a member of the DAP because he did not want to join any of the established, 
parliamentary parties, but did not possess the wherewithal to establish a party of his own.  
Although originally a deterrent, the size of the DAP provided Hitler with the opportunity 
to organize the party as he saw fit and lead it in the direction he felt most appropriate.81 
 Hitler organized and publicized the first popular meeting of the renamed NSDAP 
in February 1920.82  Although he was not the headline speaker for the meeting, he stirred 
the highest level of response from the audience.83  Essentially, Hitler appealed to the 
crowd’s negative emotions and offered National Socialism as the cure to society’s ills.84  
Hitler based the policies and goals of the NSDAP along racial lines, espousing the purity 
of the German people and the cleansing of the German nation of the Jewish threat.  Hitler 
ascended to party chairman in 1921.  He utilized the Treaty of Versailles as a rallying cry 
for the party and as ammunition against the Weimar government.85  He used this 
“Marxist work of destruction, and enemy propaganda poison” to “put [his audiences] 
beyond reason.”86  Again, Hitler used lessons gained from his observation of the Social 
Democrats in Vienna to understand the power of the mob mentality over logic and 
reason.  Hitler argued that the Jew, economic circumstances, and social constructs led to 
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the weakness of the people; only those with the will to struggle have the right to live in 
this world.87  Weak people, or “half” people are defeated, whereas “whole” people 
succeed.  Hitler claimed, “The Revolution of the year 1918 did away with the 
government, disorganized the army, and delivered the administrative bodies over to party 
corruption.”88  In 1923, Hitler and General Ludendorff, one of the military leaders of the 
Reichswehr during World War I, organized a coup, known as the Beer Hall Putsch, of the 
Bavarian government, with the intention of then challenging the Weimar government.89  
On March 8, 1923, Hitler and the Sturm Abteilung (SA), took control of a public meeting 
claiming that revolution had begun and roused the audience to follow him.  Ultimately, 
the dispersion of the demonstration resulted in the death of sixteen party members and 
four policemen.  Clearly, Hitler had an immediate impact on the development of the 
NSDAP.  Following his jail time, Hitler committed the party to radicalizing the German 
people through popular elections. 
 Many of the elements of these party guidelines involve the neutralization of their 
political and racial enemies, and the rehabilitation of self-preservation and 
nationalization.  According to political scientist Ernst Fraenkel, Nazi Germany was a dual 
state.  The governance of the Third Reich existed at two levels: the state and the party.  
Once the NSDAP assumed power in 1933, Hitler’s ideologies and the party’s ideologies 
developed into the ideologies of the state as well.  Historian Eberhard Jäckel argued that 
for Hitler, the state was an end to a means.90  Essentially, the assumption of authority in 
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Nazi Germany was for the elimination of the Jewish threat.  Hitler declared his party 
guidelines the “Fundamental Law” of the state once the NSDAP seized power.91  Thus, 
his worldview primarily concerned the advancement of the German nation and the Jewish 
purge.  Thus, Hitler’s messianic and ideological mission extended into the state and into 
the military.  In his role as Führer and commander of the armed forces, he utilized 
chemical gas during the Holocaust.  However, Hitler did not deploy chemical warfare on 
the Eastern Front.  The absence of chemical weapons was in opposition to his worldview 
and his messianic mission. 
 
Hitler in Nazi Germany 
 Hitler’s and the Nazi party’s ascension to power provided him with the 
opportunity to transform his ideals into reality.  Most notably, Hitler’s policies leading up 
to World War II from 1933 through 1939 gradually radicalized and grew more violent.  
His decrees most often seemed to center around the cleansing of the German state and of 
the German people of those he considered undesirable – including Jews, political 
enemies, and the mentally or physically disabled.  Through the exercise of his authority, 
Hitler began to reveal a hint of the atrocities he was capable of committing.  Following 
Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, the Reichstag fire in late 
February precipitated in the suspension of basic rights and permitted imprisonment 
without trial.92  Then, the Enabling Act in March 1933 granted Hitler and his cabinet 
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legislative powers for four years without Constitutional limits.93  Thus, Hitler and the 
NSDAP ascended to almost absolute authority.  In many ways, “cleansing” thematically 
described Hitler’s policies following the Nazi rise to power and the establishment of the 
Third Reich.  Politically, the suspension of basic rights and the legal ability to detain 
without trial allowed Hitler and the NSDAP “cleanse” their political enemies from the 
Weimar government.  For example, the German Communist Party was suppressed and 
many leaders of the party were arrested and sent to makeshift concentration camps.  
Hitler also banned the Social Democratic Party.94  By July, the NSDAP was the only 
legal political party in Germany.  Furthermore, the NSDAP banned trade unions in lieu of 
the German Workers’ Front.  As Hitler learned during his years in Vienna and during 
World War I, Social Democrats and Marxists used unions as tools to achieve their own 
political ends.  Union strikes can hurt the national economy and force compliance from 
the national government.  With the ban on unions, Hitler eliminated this threat to the 
absolute authority of the Nazis.  Lastly, Hitler organized the elimination of his own rivals 
to authority within the Nazi Party.  On the Night of Long Knives in 1934, Hitler targeted 
Ernst Röhm, the head of the SA, and other dissidents within the party that disagreed with 
the direction in which Hitler led the state and the party.95  Hitler ordered his last political 
opponents executed.  Then, in August 1934, President von Hindenburg passed away, and 
Hitler quickly consolidated the roles of President and Chancellor for himself.96  By 1934, 
no limits checked Hitler’s absolute authority. 
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 In addition to the political “cleansing” of his opponents and rivals, Hitler 
orchestrated Germany’s racial cleansing.  In Mein Kampf, Hitler argued against the 
crossing of races.  More specifically, Hitler decried the mixing of the superior “Aryan” 
gene pool with those of the lesser races.  As the creator of civilization, the “Aryan” race 
stands supreme above all others.  “Aryans” possess the greatest will for sacrifice and 
work towards the needs of the community.97  “Aryans” possess spirit instead of ego and 
exercise Pflichterfellung (performance of duty).  Hitler argued that the crossing of races 
leads to the depression of the superior race.98  The greatest races and empires collapsed 
because of crossbreeding.  All things beautiful – art, science, and technology – were the 
result of one superior race.99  Like a disease, the mixing of races leads to gradual mental 
and physical decay.  Hitler believed that to befoul the master race in such a manner was a 
sin against God.  Indeed, Hitler realized many of his radical racial policies throughout the 
Third Reich and into World War II.  These racial policies gradually radicalized over the 
years.  However, some of the earlier policies of the Third Reich paved the road to the 
Final Solution of the Holocaust.  For example, in April 1933, Hitler passed the Law for 
the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service.  Civil servants, which included 
professors, were liable for dismissal.  Indeed, these policies radicalized until the resulting 
Jewish extermination. 
 Hitler also advocated the “cleansing” of the German population, as well.  As early 
as July 1933, he authorized The Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseased 
Offspring.  Under this law, Hitler sanctioned the forced sterilization of thousands of men 	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and women at risk for carrying hereditary diseases.100  This law forced physicians to 
disclose all patients subject to or at risk to all diseases on a list circulated by the Nazi 
regime.  The Führer believed that all measures “upholding the nationhood” were 
justified.101  In 1939, Hitler also launched the T-4 Program, which ran officially from 
1939 to 1941 and unofficially from 1941 until war’s end.102  The T-4 Program authorized 
the euthanasia and murder of thousands of mentally and physically handicapped 
Germans.  Historian Ian Kershaw argued that Hitler authorized the T-4 program and the 
murder of the mentally and physically handicapped as an integral piece of his 
“ideological mission.” 103  Furthermore, the T-4 program provided “a gangway to the 
vaster extermination program to come.”  In fact, the poison gas and the crematoria were 
first utilized in the T-4 program prior to their implementation in the death camps.  Hitler 
blamed the handicaps of the German people on the mixing of races.  Clearly, Hitler 
possessed a low estimation of human life: “Really outstanding geniuses […] permit 
themselves no concern for normal human beings.”104 
 The German dictator also engaged in bellicose foreign policy.  First, Hitler 
violated the Treaty of Versailles and initiated the rearmament of the German military.  
Second, prior to the outbreak of World War II, he occupied the Rhineland and annexed 
both Austria and Czechoslovakia into the Third Reich.  According to historian Ian 
Kershaw, the Anschluss (annexation of Austria) was the defining moment of Hitler’s 
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foreign policy.105  The Führer proved to himself that he “could take on the world – and 
win.”  Furthermore, the Anschluss provided the “impetus to radicalization” that 
ultimately led to the invasion of Poland in September 1939.  Following his rise to power, 
Hitler’s “cleansing” policies and aggressive foreign policy, though on a smaller scale, 
revealed his grand designs for the rest of the Europe.  Indeed, Hitler’s goals in World 
War II represented the continued radicalization and expansion of his policies. 
  
The Goals of World War II 
 Ultimately, Hitler initiated World War II for the sake of the Lebensraum, the 
living space for the German nation.  In the first paragraph of Mein Kampf, Hitler states 
that the German and Austrian nations require reunification for “like blood belongs in the 
common realm.”106  Hitler addresses the theme of the Lebensraum on multiple occasions 
throughout the book.  For example, Hitler argued, “only a sufficiently large space on this 
earth ensures the freedom of the existence to a nation.”107  Likewise, Hitler also claimed, 
“Land and soil must be the aim of our foreign policy,” as the German borders following 
the Treat of Versailles in 1914 were insufficient.108  Hitler also advocated for the violent 
acquisition of territory in Europe for the Lebensraum when he said that “only the sword 
must provide the soil.”109  Again, Hitler connected the question of the Lebensraum to a 
justified sense of morality: 
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“What we must fight for is to assure the existence and the increase of our 
race and our people, to feed its children and keep its blood pure; we must 
fight for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, so that our 
people may ripen toward the fulfillment of the mission assigned it by the 
Creator of the Universe.”110 
  
Through these passages, Hitler lays out the clear goals of the Third Reich in World War 
II.  Although Mein Kampf was indeed a propagandistic work, Hitler was obviously 
sincere in the iteration of his worldviews.  Hitler pursued these goals through geographic 
conquest in World War II.  In his book The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler, 
historian Oskar Pinkus addresses the question of Hitler’s motives in initiating conflict 
with Europe.  Pinkus ultimately concludes that Hitler’s primary goal was a crusade for 
the subjugation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.111  According to Pinkus, Hitler 
conducted the wars in east and the west very differently.  For example, Hitler wavered 
when it came to invading Great Britain.  However, Hitler prematurely and 
enthusiastically invaded the Soviet Union in the dysfunctional Operation Barbarossa.112  
Furthermore, Hitler treated French and British POWs differently than Russian and Slavic 
POWs.  The French and the British were treated reasonably well, whereas Soviet POWs 
were slaughtered, tortured, and starved en masse, reflecting Hitler’s desire to “cleanse” 
the Lebensraum for the spread and promulgation of the German nation.  Indeed, the 
perpetration of the Holocaust further substantiates this argument.  Hitler merely engaged 
France and Great Britain because the west waged war on Germany.113 
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 On the other hand, historian Gerhard Weinberg, in his book Visions of Victory, 
argues that Hitler not only had designs on Eastern Europe, but post-war designs on 
Western Europe, as well.  Primarily, the German dictator sought the annexation of 
territory east until the Ural Mountains, including Poland, the Baltic States, and European 
Russia.114  Hitler also sought the annexation of Denmark and Scandinavia.115  In Western 
Europe, he intended to establish puppet governments in Great Britain, France, Spain, and 
Portugal.116  Hitler also wanted to establish puppet governments in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
and Hungary.117  He also had designs on African colonial possessions in western, central, 
and southern Africa.118  Furthermore, Hitler evidently intended to continue the Holocaust 
into the post-war period.  As explored by historians Klaus-Michael Mallman and Martin 
Cüppers, the Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads) had a detachment stationed in 
Athens, Greece termed Einsatzgruppe-Egypt ready for deployment to North Africa and 
the Middle East as early as 1942.  Whether under the direct supervision of the Nazi 
regime or under the supervision of the puppet governments, the policy of Jewish 
extermination was to continue.119  Nevertheless, Hitler sought the geographical 
domination of Europe for the sake of the German nation and the “cleansing” of Europe of 
undesirables.  
 Hitler pursued cultural and artistic endeavors as a means of dominance over Nazi-
occupied Europe.  Cultural policies abroad advanced party ideology of cultural 
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hegemony.  Cultural hegemony did not only apply to the spread of “Aryan” culture, but 
also the theft of cultural objects from the areas Germany conquered.  Beyond the racial 
and political purification of Europe, Hitler also aspired to build the Reich based on 
National Socialist cultural ideals, stripped of non-German principles.120  Hitler believed 
that the master race was tasked with this form of cultural imperialism as a moral duty.  
Hitler envisioned the “Aryan” conqueror of the Third Reich spreading German culture 
and National Socialist ideals across Europe.  For example, Hitler revered the dead in the 
Romantic ideal “where sacrifice validated the cause, rather than the cause itself.”121  
Hitler intended to spread and immortalize this German notion of self-sacrifice.  Hitler 
planned for a network of citadels “to glorify war, honor its dead heroes, and symbolize 
the impregnable power of the German race” across his empire from Scandinavia to North 
Africa.122  Furthermore, high culture would serve as the focal point of the Third Reich.  
For example, Hitler drew up ambitious plans to redesign major European cities across the 
Third Reich and construct museums devoted to “Aryan” art.123  Hitler said that “Wars 
come and go; cultural achievements alone survive.”  Essentially, World War II also 
served as the vehicle for this cultural imperialism. 
 German dominance of Europe also entailed the confiscation of foreign cultural 
objects.  Nazi art looting policies allowed the Nazi conquerors to pursue these desires.  
The operations of the ERR (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg) and the other competing 
cultural plundering agencies within France, Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and the 
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Soviet Union was thorough, ruthless, and efficient.  For example, Hans Frank, governor 
of Nazi-occupied Poland, issued the Order of the Confiscation of the Property of the 
Former Polish State Inside the General Government, thereby authorizing the plundering 
activities of Kajetan Mühlmann.124  Under the leadership of Mühlmann, the plundering 
squads appropriated valuable cultural objects.  Mühlmann’s squads targeted “state 
collections, universities, churches, and valuable private estates.”125  The staff scoured 
Poland thoroughly in major cities and rural village and left “scarcely a city, town, or 
significant collection […] untouched.”126  The confiscation of cultural objects 
symbolically represented Nazi cultural hegemony of occupied Europe.  Nazi Germany 
and the leadership of the NSDAP owned the right to possess or destroy the cultural 
heritage of conquered peoples.  Nazi cultural imperialism and art plundering served Nazi 
ideologies of the “Aryan” as the master race and the bringer of culture to occupied 
Europe.  Ultimately, Hitler’s geographic, racial, and cultural goals of World War II 
represented his desire to advance the will of the people both domestically and throughout 
Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
  Ultimately, Hitler was an individual capable of committing terrible atrocities for 
the sake of the Germany and the German people.  From his youth to his ascension to 
power, Hitler developed a radical set of political, social, and racial worldviews.  Hitler 
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developed his anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic views during his years in Vienna.  His 
experiences in World War II and the “stab in the back” myth exasperated and confirmed 
Hitler’s views against Jews, Social Democrats, capitalists, and Marxists.  During the 
Weimar Republic, Hitler articulated these views through the NSDAP and Mein Kampf, 
and ultimately rose to power through the positive reception of his worldviews.  Lastly, in 
Nazi Germany and through World War II, Hitler transformed his ideologies into reality 
through the gradual radicalization of “cleansing” policies.  Hitler sought the geographic 
and cultural domination of Europe as the realization of the superiority of the “Aryan” 
race.  Throughout the perpetrations of the Nazi regime, Hitler justified these actions 
through moral reasoning based on racial and pseudo-scientific foundations.  Hitler did not 
seek power for the sake of power, but rather for the realization of his goals and 
worldview.  Hitler fanatically believed in the ascension of the German people to world 
domination and sought power to steer Germany down this path.  He identified himself as 
the messiah of the German people.  Clearly, Hitler was capable of using chemical 
weapons, as he used gas in the chambers of the death camps.  Therefore, the focus now 
turns to the pressing question about the absence of chemical warfare in World War II. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHURCHILL’S THREATS 
 
Introduction 
 Hitler sanctioned terrible atrocities, but did not deploy chemical weapons 
militarily during World War II.  The absence of chemical gas poses a riddle because the 
German dictator did not hesitate to utilize any means to achieve the ends and goals of his 
crusade in Eastern Europe.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Hitler, for the sake of 
his people and his Fatherland, perpetrated the Holocaust and the slaughter of thousands of 
other civilians and soldiers, Germans included.  Therefore, Chapter Two turns to the 
discussion of Hitler’s decision to not employ chemical warfare on the Eastern Front 
during Operation Barbarossa from 1941 to 1943.  Clearly, chemical weapons were not 
really necessary for the Blitzkrieg tactics during the first summer of 1941.  However, if 
Hitler believed that at any point during the thrust into the Soviet Union that chemical 
weapons were essential to the success of the mission, then he would not have hesitated to 
unleash the German reserves of chemical gas on Russian and Slavic soldiers and 
civilians.  Once the Wehrmacht advance stalled in December 1941, Hitler could have 
ordered chemical warfare during the siege of Leningrad or turned to it in Stalingrad to 
avoid the brutal door-to-door urban combat.  Counterfactually, the use of chemical 
weapons could have resuscitated Operation Barbarossa to the advantage of the 
Wehrmacht.  Therefore, external circumstances influenced Hitler’s decision to abstain 
from deploying chemical weapons on the Eastern front.  In May 1942, Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill of Great Britain announced publicly that the use of chemical weapons 
on the Soviet Union would result in massive retaliation against Germany, in the form of 
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aerial chemical weapon bombardments of German cities and towns.127  Ultimately, this 
threat of massive retaliation played a significant role in Hitler’s decision not to employ 
chemical warfare on the Eastern front.  At this stage in the war, Hitler sought to avoid the 
“mutually assured destruction” of his Allied enemies and his own country.  Thus, Chapter 
Two explores Churchill’s threats, his acts of deterrence, and the other possible factors 
that influenced Hitler’s decision-making process. 
 
Fritz Haber 
 The rapid advancement, sophistication, and killing power of European weaponry 
in the late nineteenth century led to the subjugation and expansion of European colonial 
holdings.  Prior to World War I, European colonial soldiers unloaded these new killing 
machines on colonial natives.128  However, the advent of the Great War forced the 
Entente and Central powers to turn these weapons on each other in the furious bloodbath 
of trench warfare.  Indeed, World War I introduced the concept of industrialized warfare.  
Chemical weapons played a significant role in this war of attrition.  At the forefront of 
science and technology, German scientists gave birth to weaponized chemical gas and 
chemical warfare.  Born in 1868, Fritz Haber, a German-Jewish chemist, first achieved 
international acclaim fixing nitrogen from air.129  Like many German Jews, Haber was 
extremely patriotic and believed that science would lead to Germany’s international 
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ascendancy.130  Following his rise to prominence pre-World War I, Haber established an 
institute that helped nurture the next generation of scientists.  Haber also believed in the 
practical application of science and the connection of science and industry.  When World 
War I broke out, Haber committed himself and his institute’s work wholly to Germany’s 
total victory.131  As the head of the chemical division in the War Ministry, Haber 
developed the first weaponized chemical agents, and his colleagues developed the first 
deployment methods in 1914.132  Haber hoped that this new form of warfare would end 
the stalemate on the Western front and turn the tide of the war in Germany’s favor.  
Ironically, it was a Jewish scientist invented the gas that Hitler would use in the chambers 
of the death camps: Zyklon-B.  Haber’s patriotism and the utilization of his expertise for 
the war effort was not unique to Haber alone.  For example, Walter Rathenau, the 
rationing minister, extended the war for another two years through his savvy 
administration of the war on the domestic front.  Nevertheless, historian Fritz Stern, 
author of Dreams and Delusions, argued that Haber and his institute’s scientific 
contribution made them the Manhattan project of World War I.133  In addition to the other 
contributions of Haber’s institute, chemical gas alone served as an efficient way to clear 
enemy trenches and undermine enemy morale. 
 Although the Germans invented chemical gas, the Entente powers quickly 
developed their own chemical agents to use in retaliation.  Both the Entente and the 
Central powers developed more sophisticated respirators and gas masks to address the 
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threat of chemical warfare.  Likewise, delivery methods continued to be refined, an 
advance that challenged the sophistication of respirators.  In many ways, chemical 
warfare represented an early form of escalation, as both opponents sought to achieve 
military dominance in this field.  As Hitler discovered in 1918, Allied delivery methods 
of chemical gas still affected war in the trenches, despite the advancement of the gas 
masks.  Although the invention of chemical gas did not determine the outcome of World 
War I, these chemical agents affected the conduct of trench warfare.  Just as chemical 
weapons in World War I represented an early form of escalation, Churchill likewise 
introduced the concept of deterrence through the threat of chemical warfare. 
  
Winston Churchill 
 Soldier, politician, and historian, Sir Winston Churchill, in many ways, was the 
British counterpart to Hitler.  A remarkable prime minister at a desperate time, Churchill 
represented Hitler’s ultimate nemesis.  Just like Hitler, Churchill did not subscribe to any 
“half-measures,” but rather conducted World War II with ruthlessness and conviction.  
Arguably, without Churchill’s leadership, Great Britain would have fallen to Germany’s 
onslaught earlier in the war.  Churchill met Hitler’s ferocity with his own fortitude, and 
this served as a deterrent to Hitler’s desired conduct of World War II.  Churchill was born 
on November 30, 1874 into the aristocratic family of the Duke of Marlborough.134  When 
Churchill turned twenty, he entered the military as a second lieutenant with the Hussars 
cavalry unit.135  Churchill spent many of his early years in the military stationed with the 
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Hussars in India.136  After his father passed away, his mother continued to spend 
extravagantly, driving the family into financial straits.137  Therefore, Churchill worked as 
a war correspondent for a newspaper and requested a leave of absence to cover the 
conflict in Afghanistan.  During his time on the Afghan campaign, Churchill and the unit 
came under hostile fire, forcing Churchill to engage the enemy himself.  Likewise, 
Churchill joined the 21st Lancers cavalry unit in Omdurman during the British campaign 
in Sudan against the Dervish army as a news correspondent.138  During the campaign, 
Churchill led his men in a cavalry charge into a unit of Dervish riflemen.  Then, during 
his coverage of the Boer War in South Africa, Boer soldiers ambushed Churchill’s rail 
car.139  Churchill again engaged the enemy, staved off the ambush, and even moved 
twenty wounded men under fire.  During his six years serving in the British military, 
Churchill witnessed war first hand and experienced active combat.  Just as Hitler saw 
combat first hand, so did Churchill.  The similarities between Churchill and Hitler 
continued into their political careers.  In many ways, Churchill’s time in the military 
imbued him with a boldness that Churchill carried into his political life. 
 After a first unsuccessful attempt, Churchill won a seat in Parliament at twenty-
six years of age as a member of the Conservative Party, representing the district of 
Oldham.140  In 1911, Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and he made 
his military experience felt immediately.141  Churchill created a naval war staff and 
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advocated a policy of vigilance.  He advised that military preparation was “the only field 
wherein immediate and sustained action of a useful nature is possible.”142  Primarily, 
Churchill was concerned by the rapid and unrestricted build-up of German naval 
strength.143  His most notable achievement during his tenure as the First Lord of the 
Admiralty was his convincing of Parliament to purchase the majority stake in the Anglo-
Persian oil company as a substantial and permanent source of fuel for the military.144  
When World War I broke out, Churchill served on the Western Front with the 6th 
Battalion of Royal Scots Fusiliers and led thirty-six incursions into “no man’s land.”145  
Then, the wartime government called upon Churchill to return to London and serve as the 
Minister of Munitions in 1917.  Following the war in 1922, the Conservative government 
fell from power, and Churchill lost his seat in Parliament.  He returned to Parliament in 
1924, along with a Conservative majority, and served as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.146  In his role, Churchill attempted to return to the gold standard, which failed 
miserably.  The Conservatives again fell from power in 1929.  Churchill retained his seat 
in Parliament, but would not hold an office within the government for ten years.  
Churchill’s isolation from the seats of power resulted from his adamant opposition to the 
prospect of Indian independence.147 
 Following the Nazi ascension to power in 1933 and Hitler’s initiation of 
rearmament policies, Churchill proved extremely vocal in his warnings about Germany’s 
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resurgence.148  Likewise, Churchill made caustic attacks on the Chamberlain government 
for the appeasement policies that culminated at the Munich conference.  As Churchill 
witnessed Germany preparing for war, he was no longer in a position to influence the 
policies of the British military.  Churchill saw Great Britain as the deterrent to German 
ambitions on the European continent, but isolated from the government, Churchill could 
only watch events unfold.  In October 1941, Churchill claimed that Hitler was the only 
enemy that mattered, seemingly implying that while Churchill despised Hitler, he also 
respected the German dictator.149 
 In 1939, after ten years isolated from the government, the outbreak of World War 
II resulted in Churchill’s return to government as the First Lord of the Admiralty and as a 
member of the War cabinet.150  After the German attack in France and the Benelux 
countries on March 10, 1940, the king appointed Churchill as the next prime minister.151  
However, upon assuming office, Churchill faced disaster with the fall of France.152  
Churchill’s goal for the resolution of World War II was simple: Great Britain would 
continue the war against the Axis Powers, alone if necessary, until the British achieved 
total victory, even if this entailed the engagement of the United States.  Churchill even 
prepared Great Britain for the possibility of a successful German invasion.153  Churchill 
transferred gold and foreign exchange and securities reserves to Canada and prepared 
Britain for guerilla warfare.  In the words of historian Gerhard Weinberg, Churchill was 	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“convinced that Germany must be utterly crushed this time and that there could be no 
reliance on internal opponents of the Hitler regime.”154  Furthermore, he believed that 
“only a complete defeat of Germany would preclude a third German attempt at world 
domination and secure Britain from a German threat.”155  Ultimately, Churchill sought 
the “unconditional surrender” of Hitler and Nazi Germany.156  At Yalta, Churchill argued 
against war trials and instead argued for the immediate execution of the leaders of the 
Third Reich like “outlaws.”157  Both Churchill and Hitler were soldiers turned politicians 
– bold, military-minded men at the helms of their nations during World War II.  Both 
sought the total obliteration of their enemies – Hitler and his genocidal war in Eastern 
Europe and Churchill and his crusade against Nazi Germany.  Both utilized radically 
violent methods to achieve their respective goals for World War II.  Hitler perpetrated the 
horrors of the Holocaust, while Churchill ordered the utter desolation of German cities.  
Clearly, Churchill played a decisive role as the deterrent to Hitler’s use of chemical 
weapons on the Eastern front.  Later, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and American 
airpower further contributed to Hitler’s deterrence. 
 
The Eastern Front 
 Hitler was capable of committing terrible atrocities as the means to his ultimate 
goals of World War II.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Hitler engaged Great 
Britain and France because of the threat they posed.  However, the subjugation of Eastern 	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Europe served as Hitler’s primary objective during World War II.  The invasion of the 
Soviet Union represented a major stepping-stone to the realization of his messianic 
mission: 
Our gains in the West […] constitute a contribution to our general 
security, but our Eastern conquests are infinitely more precious, for they 
are the foundations of our very existence.158 
 
Russia had never been conquered by a foreign entity.  The Soviet Union was an imposing 
entity, covering 8.5 million square miles with a 750-mile front.159  The country had a 
population of 195 million.  Furthermore, in 1941, only three percent of the roads in the 
Soviet Union were paved, a challenging situation exacerbated by the fact that the Soviets 
used a wide-gauge railroad line, unusable by any other than Russian trains.  Lastly, the 
harsh winters had a devastating effect on invading armies.  However, when Hitler 
launched Operation Barbarossa, both British and American military minds expected the 
collapse of the Soviet Union under the blitzkrieg of the Wehrmacht.160  Churchill hoped 
that Stalin would at least “attempt a vain resistance.”161  In the words of one British 
general, the Germans “would go through [the Russians] like a hot knife through 
butter.”162  During the first summer in 1941, Hitler had every reason to feel confident in 
the success of his invasion of the Soviet Union, as the Wehrmacht marched decisively 
through Ukraine. 163   Clearly, chemical warfare did not fit into the strategies of Hitler’s 
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blitzkrieg into the Soviet Union.  However, the invasion of the Soviet Union soon stalled, 
and the winter of 1941 severely hampered the Wehrmacht advance.  The original plan of 
his general staff was a straight march to Moscow, the political and economic center of the 
Soviet Union, thus ending the conflict before winter.164  However, Hitler, possibly 
overconfident in the strength of his invading force and underestimating the challenges of 
invading the Soviet Union, developed a strategy of his own, antithetical to that of his 
general staff.  Hitler proposed a pincer strike into the Soviet Union from launching points 
in the Ukraine.165  One pincer would march through Leningrad, the other through 
Stalingrad.  The armies marching through Stalingrad would break off an auxiliary force 
to capture the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus Mountains.  The pincer would then close 
on Moscow.  Oddly, Hitler was not interested in the capture of Moscow, and his 
“directive contained a large number of disconnected objectives with priority given to 
none.”166  Thus, Hitler spread his forces too thinly and created a logistical nightmare 
where none need have existed.  The result was that the Wehrmacht became bogged down 
in a war of attrition against the superior manpower and resources of the Soviet Union. 
 The transformation of Operation Barbarossa from a war of mobility into a war of 
attrition presented the opportunity for the deployment of chemical warfare.  In December 
1941 alone, the Wehrmacht lost one thousand tanks and two thousand locomotives 
specifically designed for the wide-gauge Soviet rail lines.167  Two key battles in 
Operation Barbarossa, the Siege of Leningrad and the Battle of Stalingrad, chemical 
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weapons could have easily cleared the respective cities of soldiers and civilians.  The 
Siege of Leningrad lasted over two years, while the Battle of Stalingrad lasted over five 
months in the bloodiest fighting of the war.  In December 1941, Hitler’s general staff 
examined the possibility of destroying Leningrad with chemical weapons.168  The 
findings revealed that preparations for such a strike required thirty days.  However, the 
Luftwaffe could have doused the city with chemical agents in a matter of days.  Hitler 
could have achieved two significant German victories in these battles with chemical 
warfare.  However, he still refrained from using chemical weapons on the Eastern front.  
Clearly, the question was not moral in nature.  Hitler used chemical agents in the gas 
chambers of the death camps on the Jews.  Hitler thought of Russians and Slavs as 
animals and treated them as such in the POW camps.169  Hitler tested Zyklon-B on 
Russian POWs before widespread implementation in the death camps.170  At war’s end, 
in July 1945, the majority of POWs in the Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Lublin, and other 
concentration camps were gassed to prevent their release to the Soviet army.  The 
Wehrmacht killed 3.5 million out of the 5.7 million captured Russian and Slavic soldiers 
through starvation, exposure, exhaustion, or execution.  Hitler did not have any qualms 
about using chemical agents on either citizens or soldiers. 
 Furthermore, the use of chemical weapons in World War I clearly set a precedent 
for chemical warfare in spite of the Hague Convention of 1925 banning the use of 
asphyxiating gases on the battlefield.  Indeed, beginning in 1932 and continuing through 
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World War II, the Japanese set the precedent for chemical warfare with their use of 
chemical agents militarily against the Chinese.171  The Japanese began developing 
stockpiles of chemical weapons in 1918 at the end of World War I.  During World War 
II, Unit 731, a covert biological and chemical weapon research division of the Japanese 
Imperial Army, experimented on thousands of Chinese human guinea pigs.  Likewise, 
Hitler did not hesitate to violate treaties or international agreements.  Hitler thought that 
the League of Nations was a “den of intrigue woven against Germany, binding Germany 
to obligations none of the others intended to keep.”172  Back in 1933, Hitler removed 
Germany from the League of Nations and in complete violation of the Treaty of 
Versailles began rearming the Third Reich.173  The German dictator occupied the 
Rhineland and annexed Austria despite international pressure.  Hitler did not compromise 
in foreign affairs and instead pursued the course of action he felt best served the 
advancement of the German people. 
 The absence of chemical warfare on the Eastern front was not a matter of 
insufficient caches or supplies.  Under the direction of Otto Ambros, head of the IG 
Farben chemical development program, “major breakthrough[s] led to the development 
of nerve gases” in 1936.174  Previously, chemical gases were not definitively fatal, but 
rather served to clear trenches in World War I, create chaos, and cause massive numbers 
of injuries.  However, tabun was the first nerve gas that caused fatalities in mere 
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minutes.175  In 1941, the Wehrmacht possessed 40,000 tons of tabun.  IG Farben also 
fabricated the nerve agents, sarin and somar.176  Developed in December 1941, sarin was 
six times more potent than tabun, and by 1942, the general staff deemed the supply of 
nerve agents sufficient for employment on the Eastern Front.177  In 1941, the army 
ordnance office lobbied the Führer to employ chemical warfare, arguing that the military 
needed to conserve munitions in order to sustain the invasion of the Soviet Union, and 
chemical warfare could serve that purpose well. 178  Furthermore, the Soviets were not 
well equipped defensively against chemical warfare.  Clearly, Hitler possessed weapons 
of mass destruction, capable of dealing horrific and painful losses to the soldiers and 
citizens obstructing his conquest of the Soviet Union.  With his low estimation of human 
life, Hitler’s decision was surprising.  Ultimately, outside forces stayed Hitler’s hand for 
the employment of chemical warfare.  Winston Churchill served as this force of 
deterrence. 
  
“Mutually Assured Destruction” 
 Faced with the subjugation of Europe under the thumb of Hitler and Nazi 
Germany, Churchill resolved to fight until the Third Reich fell.  The exercise of chemical 
warfare was simply a means to this end.  Churchill had no qualms about employing 
chemical weapons against Germany and the German people.  In fact, as early as 1920, 
Churchill sanctioned the use of chemical gas against the Kurds during a British campaign 
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in Iraq.  Prior to Stalin’s request for British retaliation, Churchill and his military advisors 
were prepared to use chemical weapons against Germany.179  Specifically, Churchill 
prepared chemical warfare as a defensive strategy against a German invasion of Great 
Britain.180  Then, in March 1942, Stalin, concerned about the possibility of Germany 
using chemical weapons in their spring offensive, requested assurances from Churchill 
for retaliation against Germany.181  In response, Churchill promised Stalin that the British 
military would treat any chemical attack against the Soviet Union as if it were a chemical 
attack against Great Britain and would retaliate with massive force.  Churchill publicly 
announced these assurances over several radio addresses, seemingly to inform Hitler and 
Nazi Germany of his threats.182  Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Great Britain 
stood alone against the Third Reich.  Following the survival of the initial onslaught of the 
Wehrmacht, the Stalin and the Soviet Union presented an important ally to the British by 
opening a second front and shifting the burden away from Great Britain.183  Therefore, 
preserving the Eastern Front was an important priority for Churchill, a consideration that 
helps explain this promise to Stalin. 
 Indeed, Churchill and the Royal Air Force (RAF) possessed the resources to 
retaliate against German chemical warfare on the Eastern front.  During the Battle of 
Britain in the summer of 1940, the issue arose amongst the Nazi leadership whether or 
not to launch a full-scale invasion of Great Britain.  Hitler ultimately decided that he 
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wanted to achieve air supremacy before committing to an invasion.184  The Luftwaffe 
attacked London and other urban areas with a larger fighting force than that of the RAF.  
However, the superior pilots of the RAF, in the words of Churchill, turned the tide of 
battle in favor of the RAF throughout the summer.  For example, during the week of 
August 24, the RAF lost fifty-nine aircraft, while the Luftwaffe lost 145 aircraft.185  
Ultimately, the unsustainability of losses by the Luftwaffe forced Hitler to abandon 
“Operation Sea lion.”186  The Battle of Britain was a crippling blow to the strength of the 
Luftwaffe.  According to Winston Churchill, by May 1941, the RAF possessed more 
firepower than the Luftwaffe.187  Furthermore, Hitler diverted Luftwaffe aircraft in support 
of Operation Barbarossa and to aid the Afrika-korps in North Africa.  Therefore, in terms 
of air superiority, Churchill could deliver on his promise to Stalin.  In a telegram message 
to Stalin on March 20, 1942, Churchill claimed that he possessed enough chemical 
weapons to douse German cities in chemical agents:  
I have been building up an immense store of gas bombs for discharge from 
aircraft, and we shall not hesitate to use these over all suitable objectives 
in Western Germany from the moment that your armies and people are 
assaulted in this way.188 
 
Although not of the same lethality of the tabun and sarin that the Germans possessed, the 
British military produced caches of phosgene and mustard gas, capable of spreading 
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suffering and death among the civilians of these targeted German cities.189  In fact, the 
only casualties of chemical warfare in World War II were the result of Allied chemical 
agents.  An American shipment of one hundred tons chemical weapons en route to the 
Eastern front was bombed by a German air raid at Bari, Italy on December 2, 1943.190  
The shipment was meant for retaliatory measures against the Germans.  Over a thousand 
Allied soldiers and Italian citizens died as a result of the accidental release of the 
chemical agents.  The Allied High Command covered up the incident hoping that 
Germany would not learn of the presence of their chemical weapons.  General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was concerned that German knowledge of Allied gas in Europe would 
provoke a preemptive German strike.  Even without nerve agents, the Allied forces 
clearly possessed the means to perpetrate brutal acts of chemical warfare against German 
civilians.  Furthermore, the British designed biological warfare against the Third 
Reich.191  By the winter of 1943, the British military designed bombs, constructed by 
American factories, capable of spreading anthrax spores throughout an urban area.  The 
bombs would kill anyone within a square mile and then create an uninhabitable area.  In 
1944, Churchill purchased half a million of these anthrax bombs from America merely as 
a “first installment.”192  However, the successful invasion of Normandy induced 
Churchill to refrain from employing these weapons of mass destruction.  In the summer 
of 1944, Germany initiated V-1 rocket attacks against London, prompting the Prime 
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Minister to advocate chemical retaliation.193  Thus, Churchill’s threats presented an 
important decision that Hitler needed to make: the devastation of the Soviet Union at the 
cost of the German people.  In essence, Churchill, in his role as Hitler’s deterrent, 
introduced an early form of “mutually assured destruction.” 
 
Hitler’s Decision 
 As seen in Mein Kampf, Hitler obviously was traumatized by his own experience 
with chemical weapons in World War I.  Thus, the apparent explanation for bowing to 
Churchill’s threats was that he did not want the German people, whom he claimed to love 
and whose interests he purported to advance, to suffer the same fate as he.  However, 
chemical weapons had advanced to a level of sophistication that his people would not 
only suffer as he did, but also perish in the process.  However, monocausal explanations 
such as this rarely serve to uncover the depth of Hitler’s decision-making process.  Hitler 
claimed that “although Germany had developed chemical weapons, [he] was not 
interested in their employment so long as [Germany was not] in an extreme 
emergency.”194  In the summer of 1941, Hitler did not see the need for chemical warfare, 
as his strategy for Operation Barbarossa successfully carried the Wehrmacht through the 
western Soviet Union.  Hitler received Churchill’s threat in May 1942.  Even though the 
advance of the Wehrmacht had stalled, perhaps Hitler did not yet see the situation as an 
emergency worthy of needlessly sacrificing the lives of civilians home in Germany.  He 
launched a spring and summer offensive in 1942.  However, with the defeat of the 
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German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in 1943, the tide of the war turned against the Third 
Reich and the situation grew more desperate.  Furthermore, as the Allies worked their 
way through North Africa and Italy, the swift end of the war against the Soviet Union 
would free German resources to combat Allies in the Mediterranean, as well as restart an 
offensive against Great Britain.  However, the threat of chemical weapons directed at 
Germany would force Hitler to wage chemical warfare on both Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union.  Faced with this logistical issue, Speer estimated that the current caches of 
chemical weapons were insufficient for two fronts.195  The 40,000 tons of chemical 
agents amassed by 1942 were more than sufficient for the use of chemical warfare for the 
subjugation of the Soviet Union, but not enough for two separate theaters in Europe.  
Many of Hitler’s general staff saw chemical gas as an offensive weapon, as opposed to a 
defensive weapon.  Thus, the Wehrmacht’s retreat out of the Soviet Union was not the 
opportune time to utilize chemical weapons, but rather during the offensive push into the 
Soviet Union.196  Therefore, faced with a worsening situation on the Eastern front and the 
threat of retaliation on the Western front, Hitler could not logistically wage chemical 
warfare against both of his enemies. 
 However, Germany’s civilian air defense remained suspect.  First, there was a 
severe deficiency in the number of requisite gas masks available to protect the civilian 
population from chemical warfare.197  Second, the Luftwaffe was already crippled by the 
Battle of Britain and then spread thin across North Africa and the Soviet Union.  The 
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Luftwaffe did not possess any reserve forces in case of emergency.198  Building German 
aircraft required six times the amount of time required for a British or American factory 
to produce a comparable aircraft.199  Therefore, not only did the RAF outnumber the 
Luftwaffe, but also the disparity of air supremacy between the Allies and Nazi Germany 
would continue to widen.  Hitler also wanted to concentrate German production on 
bombers and not fighters.200  Without sufficient fighters, the Luftwaffe pilots essentially 
did not challenge any RAF bombers and the latter could be loaded with bombs containing 
chemical weapons not to mention incendiaries that would torch German cities.  Lastly, 
cities were not well defended with anti-aircraft artillery.  In 1940, Hitler ordered the 
construction of shelters and air raid sirens built into urban areas.201  Hitler envisioned 
transforming Germany into “one, single integrated defense unit.”202  He determined that 
German towns and cities required air defense with floodlights and mirrors to blind pilots.  
Furthermore, Hitler predicted that with an estimated annual production of six thousand 
anti-aircraft guns, every civilian man and woman could provide the manpower for air 
defense crews.  However, with the allocation of priorities and resources, the only real 
protection for German civilians were the air raid bunkers, which were insufficient to meet 
the needs of large cities like Hamburg or Dresden.  The British began their bombing 
campaign as early as 1940.  From 1942 until the end of the war, the British, and then the 
American, bombing of German cities grew increasingly unrestricted and targeted urban 
and civilian zones.  In 1940, the Luftwaffe managed relatively successful defensive 	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measures that forced the cease of British bombing until the summer of 1941.  However, 
by 1941, the strength of the RAF thoroughly dominated that of the Luftwaffe.203  
Churchill considered Nazi Germany’s air strength Hitler’s most significant 
vulnerability.204 Furthermore, new bombing strategies under Air Marshal Harris 
transformed the sphere of RAF strategic bombing.205  Despite the continuous 
bombardment of German cities, Hitler did not order the Luftwaffe to retaliate against the 
British in any form, following the end of Operation Sea Lion.  The Luftwaffe was merely 
capable of providing a paltry defense, already spread thin across the other fronts of the 
European theater.  Therefore, in terms of defending his people from the British, Hitler 
was at the mercy of the RAF, while his attentions were turned eastward to the Soviet 
Union. 
 Hitler issued an order to Speer to prepare militarily and industrially for chemical 
warfare in April 1943.206  However, Hitler ultimately backed down.  Hitler even blamed 
Churchill for the outbreak of World War II: “It is a pity that I have to wage war on 
account of that drunk [Churchill] instead of serving the works of peace.”207  However, 
Hitler, at the same time, also respected Churchill as a solider and as an artist.208  In fact, 
Hitler did not intend to incarcerate Churchill at war’s end, as he intended for other 
wartime leaders of the Allies.  Clearly, Hitler expressed a variety of views concerning 
Winston Churchill, but nevertheless took Churchill’s threats seriously.  Hitler was a risk 	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taker.  However, Hitler did not test the validity of Churchill’s threats, despite the pressing 
need for a “game changer” on the Eastern Front.  Hitler was not willing to consider 
whether the threats of retaliation were a bluff.  Furthermore, Hitler’s crusade against the 
Soviet Union was a form of Holy War.  As stated earlier, Hitler’s struggle against the 
Jews and Bolshevists was a morally and religiously justified act of God.  Hitler was the 
messiah of the “Aryan” race, guiding the ascendance of the German people and 
protecting them from the Jewish mission ushering the collapse of civilization.  Clearly, 
Operation Barbarossa was a significant piece of Hitler’s mission in his life on Earth.  As 
the campaign stalled and then failed, Hitler continued to abstain from chemical warfare in 
Russia.  Therefore, Hitler’s actions perhaps betrayed his true feelings toward Churchill, 
aside from his comments to his Nazi associates.  Hitler was wary of Churchill and 
conscious of the destruction he was capable of causing to Germany and the German 
people.  To Hitler, the danger Churchill posed was very real.  Real enough that Hitler 
allowed the failure of Operation Barbarossa without taking more extreme measures.  
Faced with a plethora of wartime and logistical challenges, Hitler was not willing to test 
Churchill’s ruthless devotion to the collapse of Nazi Germany at the cost of the lives of 
the German people at this point in World War II.  Churchill effectively served as Hitler’s 
ultimate deterrent. 
 
Conclusion 
 Operation Barbarossa (1941-1943) was the lynchpin of Hitler’s crusade in Eastern 
Europe for the establishment of the Lebensraum.  The absence of German chemical 
warfare in, what Hitler considered primary targets, Leningrad and Stalingrad once the 
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initial push into Soviet territory stalled was puzzling.  Furthermore, once the tide turned 
in favor of the Red Army, Hitler continued to abstain from chemical warfare.  Hitler was 
capable of terrible atrocities for the sake of his commitment to welfare of the German 
people.  Hitler employed chemical agents extensively for the Holocaust and even gassed 
large numbers of Russian POWs.  Hitler’s hatred for Jews and Bolshevists did not extend 
to the military battlefield.  Clearly, based on the psychoanalysis of Hitler, outside forces 
influenced this crucial chain of events.  Sir Winston Churchill, the prime minister of 
Great Britain, served as this deterrent to Hitler’s ambitions.  Ruthlessly dedicated to 
Hitler’s defeat and the collapse of the Third Reich, Churchill and, more importantly, the 
RAF possessed the means and resources to cause untold destruction to German cities and 
German civilians.  Utterly defenseless to the movements and attacks of the RAF, Hitler 
was at the mercy of Churchill.  Although Hitler’s own experience with chemical gas in 
World War I most likely affected his attitude towards chemical warfare against German 
civilians, the addition of other factors weighed against the Wehrmacht also affected his 
decision to back down to Churchill’s threats of retaliation.  Faced with significant 
logistical challenges, Hitler could not risk the safety of tens of thousands of German 
civilians even for his holy mission in the Soviet Union.  Clearly, Hitler still held hope for 
the success of the Third Reich in World War II.  However, by 1944 and into 1945, 
Hitler’s mental and physical state began to unravel and thus changed his attitude towards 
chemical warfare. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SPEER’S DEFIANCE 
 
Introduction 
 Faced with the destruction of the German people at Churchill’s hands, Hitler 
ultimately backed down in the face of the British prime minister’s resolve.  Nevertheless, 
Hitler banked on his “miracle weapons” to turn the tide of World War II.  Hitler himself 
said that the deployment of chemical weapons would wait until the Third Reich faced an 
emergency.  However, following the defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, the war took 
a decisive turn against Nazi Germany.  As the British, American, and Soviet militaries 
closed in around Berlin, Hitler’s diminishing composure and irrational decisions began to 
reflect the collapse of the governmental structure of the Third Reich.  As his mental and 
physical status deteriorated, Hitler’s thoughts turned to his own suicide, the destruction of 
Germany, and the decimation of the German people.  Previously concerned with the 
preservation of the “Aryan” race to the point of pursuing Operation Barbarossa’s success 
without chemical warfare, this gradual acceptance of extinction illustrated the breakdown 
of Hitler’s confidence in “total victory.”  In his bunker under the Reich Chancellery, 
Hitler faced the impending doom of the Allied assault.  Indeed, many, including Albert 
Speer, questioned Hitler’s sanity.  Thus, faced with the limited options of the defeated, 
Hitler issued the Führer order for the complete destruction of all German infrastructures 
on March 19, 1945.  Famously referred to as the “Nero Decree,” Hitler’s scorched-earth 
policy hastened Nazi Germany’s path to catastrophe.  However, despite Hitler’s and 
Himmler’s last ditch efforts to crush the Allies, the SS was the only institution committed 
to fighting by spring 1945, and chemical weapons were never deployed on the battlefield, 
	   54	  
despite Hitler’s pathetic dependence on his crutch of “miracle weapons.”  The V-1 and 
V-2 rocket programs presented the most liable option for dispersing chemical agents in 
London and Paris.  In particular, the V-2 rockets had a devastating impact on Great 
Britain, so much so that Winston Churchill again raised the prospect of mass chemical 
retaliation.  However, the insufficient supply of these weapons explained their 
ineffectiveness in the final stages of the war.  Ultimately, the invasion of the Allies and 
the collapse of military command and governance of Nazi Germany in 1945 prevented 
Hitler and the few remaining fanatics dedicated to “total victory” from utilizing the 
chemical weapon stockpiles built up during the course of the war. 
 
Albert Speer 
 Ambitious, talented, and ruthlessly efficient, Albert Speer, perhaps Hitler’s 
closest associate, played a remarkable role during the final months of the Third Reich’s 
existence.  The “apologetic Nazi,” as he was later known, defied Hitler’s direct orders by 
circumventing and obstructing the execution of the Nero Decree.  More importantly, 
Speer, the logistical mastermind behind Hitler’s chemical weapons program, exercised a 
decisive part in the absence of chemical warfare during the final months of World War II.  
Although personally loyal to Hitler, Speer was not as invested in the ideologies of the 
Nazi state.  Born after the turn of the twentieth century on March 19, 1905 into a 
comfortable upper-middle class family, Speer was a member of the generation too young 
to participate directly in World War I.209  He originally wanted to pursue a degree in 
mathematics, but ultimately decided to follow his grandfather and father into architecture, 	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mostly due to his father’s urging.210  After completing his studies at university, Speer 
secured a position as Heinrich Tessenow’s assistant.211  Tessenow was a very prominent 
architect in the 1920s.  During his time at Tessenow’s institute, Speer’s students 
encouraged him to attend a meeting of the NSDAP, one where Hitler himself spoke.  
Speer claimed that during the meeting, he was mesmerized by Hitler’s rhetoric, and thus, 
in 1931, he joined the Nazi party.212  However, this episode clearly portrayed his 
devotion to his own personal advancement.  Despite his birth into a politically energized 
generation, Speer neither discussed nor subscribed to political ideologies.  For the 
entirety of his young life, he did not profess any strong political views.213  Following the 
Wall Street crash in 1929, the NSDAP gained a substantial number of seats in the 
Reichstag and earned a plurality in 1932.  Furthermore, the economic shockwave felt in 
Germany saw a significant dip in Speer’s salary with Tessenow’s institute since 
academics were civil servants.214  Therefore, Speer, faced with a metaphorical fork in the 
road, tossed in his lot with the rise of the NSDAP.  In fact, when President von 
Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor in 1933, Speer did not recognize the enormity of 
the party’s success, but rather cared more about his personal inactivity as an architect.215  
As the only district member with a car, Speer started as a driver for party members, but 
this position clearly served as a way to meet more senior members.  Thus, he met Karl 
Hanke and secured his first commission redecorating the West End Berlin district 
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headquarters.216  Hanke would help Speer acquire more commissions in the future.  In 
1933, Hitler personally approved Speer’s designs for the Nuremberg rally.217  Through 
this one project, Hitler assigned Speer to work under Paul Troost, Hitler’s personal 
architect, for the renovation of the Reich’s chancellery.218  During his work on the 
Reich’s chancellery, Speer grew increasingly close to Hitler personally.  This included 
being invited to dine with the Nazi elite and receiving late night calls from Hitler to 
discuss the project.219  When Troost passed away in 1934, Speer ostensibly ascended to 
the Führer’s favorite.  By this point, Speer claimed that he was completely under Hitler’s 
sway.220  By the age of twenty-eight, Speer had sold his soul, and through his association 
with Hitler, everything he ever dreamt of was within his grasp.221 
 Speer successfully completed a variety of projects as Hitler’s favorite architect. 
For example, his entry in the 1937 Paris World’s Exposition won a gold medal.222  
However, Hitler was more concerned with leaving his mark on history.  As Benito 
Mussolini could point to Roman monuments as symbols of empire so too did Hitler want 
German monuments that people could extol centuries later.223  Hitler was excited when 
his building designs surpassed other monumental structures in terms of size.  Hitler also 
entrusted Speer with the remodeling of Berlin into the capital of the Third Reich.  The 
German dictator designed a domed great hall with a 250-meter diameter and a triumphal 
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arch 120-meters tall.224  According to historian Dan van der Vat, under his new title of 
Inspector-General for Construction of the Reich’s Capital, Hitler’s favorite architect 
developed plans to reorganize the entire city and even “expanded” on the Führer’s 
Megalomaniacal designs.225  As the architect of the capital, Speer was introduced to the 
darker side of the regime and oversaw the deportation of Jews residing in the capital.  
From August 1941 to November 1941, he ordered the removal of over seven thousand 
Jewish residents from their homes.226  Speer displayed a keen organizational sense to 
“arrange [the] speedy fulfillment of contracts awarded on the whim of a dictator who 
demanded instant gratification.”227  He would later utilize this skill set to manage the 
economy as the Armaments Minister.  Speer had already tied his fate to that of Hitler’s, 
but now Speer could safely assume his position within Hitler’s inner circle.  Speer’s 
ascension continued into the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of World War II.  
Indeed, he fully supported the invasion of Poland.  In Gitta Sereny’s biography of Speer, 
the architect said that “he was perfectly aware that [Hitler] sought world domination” and 
at the time, Speer “wanted this great man to dominate the globe.”228  Speer claimed that 
the purpose of his buildings was to celebrate Germany’s ascendance and supremacy.  
During the early years of the war, Speer even postponed his work on the capital and 
offered the services of his department to the wartime effort.229 
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 In February 1942, at thirty-eight years of age, Hitler appointed Speer as the Reich 
Armaments Minister.230  Hitler entrusted Speer with both his architectural legacy and 
with the administration of the logistics of the war effort.  Speer was Hitler’s friend, 
Hitler’s favorite minister, and shared a kindred spirit with Hitler.231  The architect turned 
Armaments Minister hid a huge ambition and sizable ego, which Hitler stroked.  Clearly, 
both Hitler and Speer had much to gain through their friendship.  Speer was not naïve and 
understood the darker side of the regime, though he failed to acknowledge much of his 
own involvement in his memoirs.  In fact, Speer utilized slave labor to support his 
armaments production.232  However, as he grew closer to Hitler and as he ascended 
through the ranks of the Nazi state, Speer likewise overlooked the regime’s darker 
aspects.233  Through his interactions with Himmler, the deportation of Berlin Jews, and 
the state construction projects at Auschwitz, Speer obviously knew about the 
Holocaust.234  According to historian Dan van der Vat, the Armaments Minister’s “ability 
to compartmentalize enabled him to separate the nature of the regime from the work he 
was doing and the character of the man who led it.”235  Furthermore, van der Vat 
considered Speer’s defense of his ignorance “‘legalistic exculpation,’” and that he 
“sidestepped the implication” of his actions.  Biographer Gitta Sereny had a much 
different perspective.  Sereny accepted Speer’s admission of moral responsibility and 
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believed that Speer did not possess explicit knowledge of the Holocaust.236  Moral 
implications aside, by 1943, as he assumed greater prominence within the administrative 
structure, Speer “harbored more than a little ambition to move into the limelight as 
‘crown prince.’”237 
 Within his new office, Speer created Central Planning in 1942, essentially 
centralizing the allocation of industrial raw materials and for the various needs of the 
Wehrmacht.238  Speer also determined the allocation of labor and the workforce.239   
Essentially, “the essence of the system (which was never laid down in detail) was not 
hierarchy or a dubious ‘leadership principle,’ but organized collaboration and a balancing 
of interests that took the output of armaments as its yardstick of success.”240  Speer 
removed bureaucrats from the administration of armament production in lieu of 
industrialists and experts.241  Speer also maximized wartime production by issuing 
ordnances dealing with international cartel agreements, quotas, “profit-oriented 
considerations,” and conflicts of interest in varying sectors that led to bottlenecks.  With 
Hitler’s trust, Speer protected his “rationalization” process of the Armaments Ministry 
from interference by the Party, the Wehrmacht, and the SS.242  By autumn 1943, Speer 
also gained control over naval armaments.243  Then, at the zenith of his power in the 
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summer of 1944, Speer gained control of Luftwaffe armaments and air defense.244  
Throughout this tenure, Speer was pegged as the possible Hitler successor.  According to 
Sereny, Speer constantly clashed with Hitler’s other subordinates like Hermann Göring 
and Heinrich Himmler, for example.245  In his system of leadership, the German dictator 
played his subleaders against each other.  Ultimately, Hitler remained the final arbiter and 
voice of authority as the Nazi elite competed for the Führer’s favor.  From 1942-1944, 
Speer’s favored position led to the accruement of his burgeoning responsibilities.  The V-
1 and V-2 rocket program, which began in was one of the few projects that he shared 
with Himmler.  Indeed, he and Himmler did not see eye-to-eye on how best to manage 
the underground rocket facilities and battled over both resource and labor allocation.246  
Speer preferred the diversion of resources to traditional military weaponry. 
 Through Speer’s influence, the growing success of Bomber Command in 1942 did 
not hurt German war production.  The wartime economy was not affected, and 
“resources, productive capacity, and labor drawn from occupied territories, armament 
production actually increased.”247  Through his ambition, talent, intellect, and closeness 
to Hitler, Speer arguably ascended through the ranks of the party to the tier of power on 
par with Goebbels and Himmler.  Although a careerist, Speer was still devoted to Hitler 
and their friendship and worked tirelessly to shore up the inefficiencies of armaments 
production to fight towards “total victory.”  However, despite his significant effect on the 
war effort, the Allies continued their relentless push towards Berlin. 	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Miracle Weapons 
 From V-1 rockets to chemical weapons, Hitler wished to unleash his miracle 
weapons during the final stages of the war and placed the last of his hopes for victory in 
these secrets of which the Allies were unaware.  According to Sereny, by 1943, Speer 
claimed that Hitler “was […] convinced that […] the miracle weapons […] would win 
the war.”248  Churchill possessed no knowledge of the existence of German nerve 
agents.249  The British Prime Minister assumed that the Germans only had stockpiles of 
mustard gas from World War I, illustrating the secrecy with which Hitler protected his 
miracle weapons.  However, much to Speer’s dismay, Hitler diverted resources critical to 
the conventional defense of the Third Reich, such that the Wehrmacht could not halt the 
advances of the Allied forces.  Likewise, the late and untimely allocation of resources to 
these miracle weapons, especially the V-1 and V-2 rockets, neither allowed time for the 
proper development nor a sufficient production to cause any significant damage to the 
Allied forces.  The development of the V-1 and V-2 rockets mostly fell under the 
jurisdiction of Himmler and the SS.  Both the V-1 and V-2 rockets, however, were not 
built for accurate strikes, but developed to hit large targets like London.  The V-1 was a 
small pilotless plane that hit its target with its payload after running out of fuel.250  The 
SS fired 22,400 V-1 rockets at London.  The V-2 was a liquid-fuel rocket that traveled at 	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a much faster speed of two thousand miles per hour, as opposed to the 375 miles per hour 
speed of the V-1 rocket.  Therefore, the V-2 rocket was much more difficult to shoot 
down on its approach.  The SS fired 3,200 V-2 rockets, resulting in the deaths of fifteen 
thousand Britons.  London presented an immense target, but technical difficulties in the 
production and allocation of scarce resources fell outside of Speer’s central command 
economy; then were not utilized with the efficiency for which Speer was known.  The 
rockets were only useful if fired in massive volley strikes, but this requirement was 
beyond German capabilities.  Thus, the SS efforts with rocket production fell flat and did 
not affect the war in any significant way.  The “employment [of V-1 and V-2 rockets] 
came too soon rather than too late,” as Nazi Germany’s resources were inefficiently 
wasted.251  The efficient development of rockets possibly could have served as a possible 
form of deterrence against the Allied bombing campaign.  Despite the futility of the SS’s 
rocket operations, Speer continued to feed Hitler information on the armaments miracle 
(Speer tripled aircraft production in 1944) and the prospect of super weapons.252  In the 
words of historian Rolf-Dieter Müller, Speer “acted on Hitler like a sedative” in the 
winter of 1944.  The young Armaments Minister “inspired Hitler to hold on, and not 
commit an act of desperation.”  Therefore, “while Speer prolonged the war, he also 
prevented its escalation into a chemical, biological, and nuclear inferno in the middle of 
Europe.” 
 With the failure of the nuclear weapons program under Werner Heisenberg, Nazi 
super weapons, or weapons of mass-destruction, lay with the development of new 
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chemical weapons.  The “Third Reich’s biggest and most secret armaments projects” was 
the tabun and sarin production plant in Dyhenfurth an der Oder. This underground facility 
produced one hundred tons per month, which was sufficiently capable of filling 120,000 
howitzer shells.253  In 1942, Speer increased chemical agent production for the upcoming 
summer offensive on the Eastern Front.  Hitler wanted to hold the upper hand in terms of 
chemical capabilities with entry of the United States into the European theater.  Hitler 
envisioned a “chemical wall” along the lines of the Eastern Front to hold the Red Army at 
bay.254  In addition to specific chemical warfare, Hitler ordered the development of 
chemicals in conventional warfare, much as the British and Americans did with the 
creation of firestorms.  For example, taifun was a chemical mixture of carbon monoxide 
and ethylene designed for dispersion into underground passages.  Soldiers could then 
ignite the entire passage as an attempt to destroy partisan tunnels on the Eastern Front.  
These unique units were called “sapper” units.  Five hundred bottles of taifun were 
available to the first sapper unit, but the first operations in 1943 of this pseudo-chemical 
warfare failed because the “sappers” could not achieve the critical level of concentration 
necessary for the ignition of the underground passages.255  Another example was the 
development of N-Stoff, a corrosive chemical that disintegrated anything including water.  
In another underground secret facility at Falkenhagen near Berlin, a few hundred tons 
were produced.  Hitler envisioned eliminating the water around the British Isles and 
creating a path for a Wehrmacht invasion, but obviously not enough of the substance was 
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produced.256  In fact, Hitler ordered Goebbels to develop a propaganda campaign based 
on the deployment of N-Stoff.  However, the Wehrmacht found no use for N-Stoff, and it 
never appeared on the battlefield. 
 Clearly, with the exception of tabun and sarin, none of the other “secret weapons” 
Hitler ordered developed possessed the possibility of turning the tide of the war in favor 
of Nazi Germany.  In fact, the allocation of resources for Hitler’s various pet projects 
disrupted Speer’s rational armaments production for the conventional defense of 
Germany against the Allied invasion.  Nevertheless, faced with the prospect of defeat and 
the collapse of the Third Reich, Hitler sought any avenue that might in turn preserve the 
“Thousand Year Reich” he hoped to create.  However, in the bunker under the Reich 
Chancellery, Hitler’s thoughts phased from preservation of the “Aryan” race into suicide 
and rampant destruction. 
 
The Tipping Point 
 With the American and British forces pushing west from Normandy and north 
from the Italian peninsula and the Red Army advancing west, Hitler felt the combined 
pressure of his enemies closing in on the throat of the Third Reich.  Furthermore, the 
bombing campaigns continued to bombard German cities, resources, military factories, 
and industries.  While Hitler and Nazi Germany perpetrated crimes against humanity on 
the Eastern Front, Churchill and the Americans committed terrible atrocities through the 
bombardment campaign against the Third Reich.  Ultimately, during the war, both sides 
of the conflict were guilty of horrible acts of violence.  However, only the victorious 	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dispensed justice, but the question of war crimes and civilian casualties in total war must 
remain in perspective.  The Allied bombing campaigns remain controversial: whether the 
use of force was justified or whether it was excessive “calculated terror.”257  According to 
historian Roy Jenkins, Churchill thought that these attacks against Germany were 
justified and was the path to victory.258  The Allied bombing campaign resulted in the 
death of approximately 420,000 and 570,000 German civilians.259  World War I tactics of 
lowering civilian morale, such as German artillery shelling of Paris, set the precedent for 
purposely targeting civilians.  In fact, engaging civilians generally was accepted by the 
high commands of both the Allies and the Axis.  Churchill pioneered the concept of 
strategic bombing in 1919 in his role as the minister of munitions in World War I and 
planned a “thousand-bomber” attack on Berlin if the Germans held the Western Front in 
1918.260  For World War II, Churchill felt that the operations of Bomber Command were 
essential to his goal of “total victory.”261  Although production of bombers “lagged,” 
according to Churchill’s timetable, numbers soon reached a point that campaigns against 
U-boats and German cities in 1940 began to have tangible effects.262  Churchill believed 
that strategic bombing was “a foretaste of what Hitler would inflict upon the British and 
American peoples if only he could get the power [;] retribution for these crimes must 
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henceforward take its place among the major purposes of this war.”263  By March 1942, 
Churchill informed Stalin that American bombers engaged in daytime bombing of 
German cities while the RAF engaged in nighttime bombing.264  The RAF and the 
American bombers created a swath of destruction that Churchill described as “blasting 
Hitler from behind while […] grappling with the Bear.”265  On a given day, bombers 
made four hundred “daytime sorties,” and on a given night, two hundred bombers carried 
three tons of explosives each.266  Rapid advancement in engine technology allowed for 
heavier tonnage capacity for each bomber.  Starting at 2800 pounds of explosives in 
1940, by 1943, four engine bombers carried 7500 pounds on average.267  The invention of 
radar further contributed to the effectiveness of Allied bombing raids.  American attacks 
on German airfields and aircraft production facilities greatly diminished fighter defense 
by the Luftwaffe.268 
 The discovery of the way to ignite a firestorm in 1943 introduced a new tactic to 
the Allied bombing of Germany.  The first firestorm developed as a natural phenomenon.  
Firestorms caused death in three different ways: the heat climbed up to fifteen hundred 
degrees Fahrenheit; winds blew at a velocity fifty feet per second within a 2.5 mile radius 
of the center sucking in people caught within the vortex; and the fire removed all of the 
oxygen in the area.269  Because the destruction of German cities required more munitions 
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and explosives with conventional bombing, Churchill thought of firestorms as a more 
economical approach to the bombing campaign.270  During the bombing of Hamburg in 
1943, Bomber Command tested a scientific approach to creating firestorms.271  Tagged 
Operation Gomorrah, bombers dropped incendiary sticks and liquid incendiaries.  Then, 
the bombers dropped firebombs, igniting a firestorm in less than forty-three minutes.  The 
firestorm created wind speeds equal to that of a Pacific hurricane and burned for three 
hours until there was nothing left to burn, taking the lives of forty to fifty thousand 
civilians – the highest body count of the bombing campaign.  Then in Dresden in 
February 1945, two attacks by British bombers and two attacks by American bombers 
desolated the third largest city in Germany.272  Dresden was an important center of 
communications and transport, with garrisoned troops, and industries all outfitted for 
armaments manufacture.  Like most other German cities, Dresden was ill prepared 
defensively for the bombings.  The Allies used these factors as the justification for their 
attack.  However, the production centers and rail lines were damaged, but not crippled 
because the British focused their fire bombing on the wooden historical center of 
Dresden, as it was easy to ignite.273  The city was further clogged with civilians fleeing 
the advance of the Red Army.  The Dresden campaign resulted in twenty thousand 
causalities, second to Hamburg.  However, the Anglo-American bombing campaign was 
a mild alternative to Churchill’s initial desire for chemical and biological warfare against 
sixty German cities.  Essentially, the use of phosphorous and other chemicals in the 
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creation of firestorms was a deadly form of chemical warfare, resulting in the swift 
deaths of tens of thousands of people.  Churchill, like Stalin and the Red Army, sought 
retribution for the terror of the Nazi regime and perpetrated terrible acts of violence in 
kind.  As the vice closed around Berlin from all sides in 1945, Hitler suffered from severe 
physical and mental strain, but continued to bank many of his hopes on his “miracle 
weapons.” 
 
The Nero Decree 
 Hitler threw every last option Germany had left at the Allies.  However, none of 
these last ditch efforts had any effect on the steady advancement of the Allies into Berlin.  
By the end of 1944, Hitler had retreated into the bunker under the Reich Chancellery and 
conducted the war command from there.  However, his thoughts quickly turned to 
thoughts of suicide and Germany’s destruction.  Hitler himself said: “May God forgive 
me the final days of this war!”274  According to Speer, Hitler also said, “If the war is lost, 
the nation will also perish [;] this fate is inevitable.”275  Furthermore, if the war was lost, 
the German people deserved extinction for their weakness and were “destined for 
destruction.”  Hitler ordered Speer not to provide civilians with necessities like food or 
shelter.276  However, Speer disobeyed this order.277  Perhaps the Armaments Minister 
first break with his beneficiary, this defiance revealed the growing divergence between 
the two “friends.”  In December 1944, Hitler organized the last German offensive of the 
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war.  However, the Ardennes offensive on the Western Front, which essentially drew 
upon the final resources of the Wehrmacht, was squashed by January and ended the last 
major military action by Nazi Germany.  The Ardennes offensive was one of many last 
ditch efforts Hitler ordered.  For example, Himmler organized “suicide squads” designed 
to sacrifice themselves to target and destroy Allied armored units with explosives.278  
Himmler also organized the deployment of V-1 and V-2 rockets.  Speer believed that if 
Hitler possessed an atomic bomb, he would not have hesitated to launch one at 
London.279  Hitler also armed units of women and Hitler Youth for the final defense of 
Berlin against the onslaught of the Red Army.280  By the winter of 1944 as Speer fell out 
of favor with Hitler, other ministers vultured his control of armaments production, but 
that led to the disintegration of the central planning that kept Germany surviving World 
War II.281  In January 1945, Hitler ordered Speer to organize the “complete destruction of 
all German infrastructure.”282  In the words of Speer, Hitler intended to “drag half the 
world with us into the abyss.”283  Then, on March 19, 1945, Hitler officially issued the 
Nero Decree ordering all local party officials, under the supervision of Speer, to destroy 
all German infrastructures. 
 More importantly, the question remains about the absence of chemical weapons 
during this final phase of the war.  Hitler deployed his other secret weapons, but chemical 
weapons, his real weapons of mass destruction, were conspicuously missing.  Hitler 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 412. 
279 Ian Kershaw, The End (The Penguin Press: 2011), 312. 
280 Joachim Fest, Inside Hitler’s Bunker: The Last Days of the Third Reich (Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux: 2002), 40. 
281 Fest, The Final Verdict, 232. 
282 Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip, 30. 
283 Fest, The Final Verdict, 235. 
	   70	  
undoubtedly intended to use chemical weapons in this suicidal state.  Following the 
surrender of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad in 1943, Hitler commanded all units of the 
Wehrmacht to prepare for the deployment of chemical weapons.284  Clearly, once the war 
turned against the Third Reich, Hitler was more prepared to accept the consequences of 
chemical warfare to check the advance of the Red Army.  Indeed, in February 1944, 
Hitler’s general staff circulated the code word “Crystal Vase.”  The activation of the code 
would signify the armed forces to initiate chemical warfare.285  However, Germany was 
not prepared to wage a chemical war on both fronts.  Otto Ambros, the head of chemical 
weapons production, estimated that the production facilities could yield a sufficient 
supply of tabun by May 1944 and a sufficient supply of sarin the following year.  Somar 
was still experimental and not ready for mass production.  Hitler saw his chemical super 
weapons as the “means of the very last and final decision” of World War II.  
Consequently, tabun production doubled, and sarin production sextupled.  Hitler believed 
that the most prudent strategy was to postpone chemical warfare as late as possible to 
deny Allied scientists the opportunity to develop their own nerve agents once the secret 
weapons were unleashed.  Despite the disappointing failure of the Ardennes offensive, 
Hitler still desired for a swift end to the war.  He hoped the sudden momentum provided 
by the nerve agents could accomplish this goal.286  Furthermore, German scientists 
developed new delivery methods for these chemical weapons.287  According to historian 
Annie Jacobsen, enough gas was available at the Dyhenfurth secret facility to lay waste 
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to the civilian populations of London or Paris.288  Hypothetically, the Wehrmacht could 
load nerve agents into V-2 rockets and target London.  In October 1944, Hitler sent 
Churchill a proposal to allow Germany to lay down a poison wall along the Eastern Front 
without British retaliation.289  Hitler perhaps made this request because Churchill and 
Roosevelt did not want the Soviets to extend beyond their original borders.290  However, 
Churchill still disagreed.  Hitler even ordered an increase in civilian chemical defense 
precautions.  Gas mask production, for example, rose dramatically.291  Many of these 
examples point to Hitler’s willingness to engage in chemical warfare against the Allies.  
However, Hitler’s most secret and potent miracle weapon remained shelved through the 
final months of World War II. 
 
Collapse 
 Despite the readiness of the military to engage in chemical warfare, Hitler did not 
issue the order.  Essentially, a combination of Speer’s interference and the overall 
collapse of governance in the Third Reich prevented the deployment of chemical 
weapons.  In the bunker, Hitler’s mental and physical wellness continued to deteriorate.  
Hitler’s mindset quickly evolved once again from catastrophe to apathy.   Hitler lost his 
motivation to lead.  Historian Ian Kershaw argued that Hitler had given up on the 
continuation of the war following the failure of the Ardennes Offensive in January 1945, 
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but could not openly admit it.292  Hitler struggled with the reality of the situation.  He 
simply continued his act of the “indomitable Führer” for the sake of his entourage.  
Nevertheless, by March of 1945, his authority waned, and his orders were disobeyed.  For 
example, Hitler ordered the rapid evacuation of German cities on both the Western and 
Eastern Fronts.293  However, the Wehrmacht did not conduct the evacuation.  In January 
1945, Speer began to question Hitler’s sanity.  Hitler ranted about his suicide, the failure 
of the German people, and the shortcomings of his subleaders.  Physically, the German 
dictator was deteriorating.  His personal physician Dr. Theodor Morrell heavily 
medicated Hitler in the final months of his life.  Hitler consumer twenty-eight pills per 
day and received numerous injections, many of which were simply glucose.294  When 
Hitler dismissed Morrell on April 21, Captain Heinz Assmann described Hitler as a 
“physical wreck who could barely walk, doing so with a stooped back and shuffling gait, 
his right leg dragging, his head shaking and his left hand trembling on the limply 
dangling arm.”295 
 Many of his subordinates had abandoned Hitler after his birthday on April 10, 
1945.  Party ideology did not sustain loyalty to Hitler.  Many simply wanted to save 
themselves and made individual plans for surrender or escape.296  Hermann Göring, for 
example, fled Berlin for one of his estates at Obersalzburg.  The only Nazi leaders who 
remained with Hitler until his suicide were Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann.  
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Clearly, Hitler’s authority waned in the closing months of the war, and order within the 
military and the Nazi state began to breakdown.  For example, Hitler organized Berlin’s 
defense, but the Wehrmacht did not carry out Hitler’s orders.297  When Hitler discovered 
this betrayal, he suffered a hysterical breakdown.  He refused to leave the bunker for 
safety.  However, once the defense of Berlin failed, Hitler admitted to the few people 
remaining in the bunker that the war was lost.  With Hitler’s growing apathy, the other 
members of the Nazi elite could not collaborate to generate any leadership at war’s 
end.298  Historian Ian Kershaw described this crisis of leadership in Nazi Germany as 
“fragmentation.”299  Because Hitler spent the entirety of the Nazi regime playing his 
subordinates off one another to create competition, the leaders could only continue to 
bicker amongst themselves.300  On April 22, Hitler essentially resigned his post.  At this 
point, Walther Wenck, general of the 12th army, stated “the fate of a single individual is 
no longer of any significance.301  Indeed, the battle over succession between Göring, 
Himmler, and Goebbels began in earnest, clearly reflecting a lack of concern for Hitler, 
the Party, or the State.302  In the final days of the war, there was no semblance of a central 
government as the other Nazi leaders sought their brief moment of power.303 
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 By March 1945, Speer began to fall out of favor with Hitler.304  Speer sent Hitler 
a memorandum stating that the war was unwinnable. Hitler threatened Speer with charges 
of treason, punishable by execution.305  As Speer’s influence declined, the economy fell 
into anarchy as Himmler and other Nazi leaders sought to dismantle Speer’s empire.306  
Despite the political chaos in Berlin, Speer continued to obstruct the Nero Decree.  From 
January to April of 1945, he made seventy trips and held over one hundred conferences 
with local Gauleiters attempting to convince them to also defy the Nero Decree.307  Speer 
also forged orders from the Wehrmacht to protect infrastructure and halted the delivery of 
explosives.  Hitler previously suspended sending food rations to German civilians, but the 
“apologetic Nazi” restarted distributing supplies to the people.308 
 Speer also played a key role in preventing chemical warfare.  He was a careerist, 
not an ideologue, and was worried about his lot following the end of the war.309  The 
Armaments Minister perhaps sought a compelling case that might save his life following 
Germany’s surrender.  In January of 1945, Speer and Ambros were both involved in the 
elimination of files and evidence at the various secret production facilities.310  In fact, at 
Speer’s sentencing at the military tribunals, the judges stated in 1946 that Speer was one 
of the few people attempting to prevent senseless destruction as per Hitler’s orders, even 
risking “personal endangerment.”311  In November 1944, Hitler ordered that chemical 
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production continue in order to meet the promised May 1945 deadline, but Speer instead 
chose to allocate those resources elsewhere, regardless of the dictator’s orders.  The 
Armaments Minister discontinued chemical production in November 1944.312  When 
Hitler asked Speer when the military could deploy the miracle weapons, Speer simply 
replied, “They’re not coming.”313  According to Sereny, Speer claimed that “he was 
outraged by the Hitler orders to destroy everything.”314  Aware of the war’s foregone 
conclusion, Speer sought to prevent destruction and tragedy befalling the German people 
because of Hitler’s hate.  His obstruction of the Nero Decree and of the chemical weapon 
program was emblematic of Speer’s attitude toward Hitler at war’s end.  Whether 
concerned for his survival after the war or for the good of the German people, his 
interference prevented the deployment of chemical weapons.  Furthermore, the launching 
points for the V-2 rockets were in the southwest region of the Netherlands.  By spring 
1945, the Allies had already captured the launching points for the rockets.  The Germans 
first retreated north to The Hague with their rockets to prevent the Allies from possessing 
this new technology.  However, from this new launching site, London was out of range 
for the V-2 rockets.  As the Germans continued to retreat east, the main targets shifted 
from Great Britain to cities in Belgium.  Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was decimated and 
incapable of launching aerial strikes on London.  Speer made these weapons unavailable 
to Hitler, and the Allied forces essentially eliminated the delivery methods.  Ultimately, 
when Speer confessed to his defiance, Hitler was barely fazed by this admittance of 
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guilt.315  Clearly, with all hope lost, Hitler did not care about Speer’s betrayal or even 
Germany’s defeat.  However, Speer was not the only Nazi official in defiance of Hitler’s 
orders.  Himmler, for example, tried to negotiate his own surrender and offered the SS to 
the Americans and the British to fight the incursion of the Red Army.316  Hitler 
committed suicide on April 30, 1945, and the war in Europe ended on May 8.  Without a 
leadership structure in place, and within the chaos of Hitler’s apathy, the miracle 
weapons were not deployed during the final months of World War II.  
 
Conclusion 
 As the tide of World War II turned against Nazi Germany, Hitler’s mental and 
physical states began to severely deteriorate.  Faced with the prospect of defeat and the 
failure of his messianic mission, Hitler’s thoughts turned to suicide and destruction.  
Thus, Hitler pursued a series of last-ditch efforts in the hope of halting the advances of 
the Allied forces.  However, following the failure of the Ardennes offensive, Hitler 
assigned Speer to conduct his scorched-earth policy, later referred to as the Nero Decree.  
Indeed, the stage was set for the deployment of Hitler’s secret chemical weapons.  
However, Hitler began to behave apathetically towards governing the Nazi regime and 
commanding the remnants of the German military.  During this crisis, Hitler’s 
subordinates could not come together to form any sort of coalition, but rather continued 
to squabble and clash as they previously had done.  In the midst of this chaos, Speer, a 
careerist very concerned with his survival following Germany’s eventual surrender, 
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sought a way to secure a positive image with the Allies.  Speer circumvented Hitler’s 
Nero Decree and prevented the senseless destruction of Germany’s infrastructure.  Speer 
also contributed to the avoidance of chemical Armageddon in Nazi Germany.  The 
Armaments Minister prevented chemical weapons from falling into Hitler’s control, 
while the military onslaught of the Allies eliminated any method of delivery for these 
weapons.  Although for the sake of his own preservation, Speer’s actions saved the lives 
of tens of thousands of German and Allied soldiers and civilians. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The industrialized warfare of World War I set the precedent for the perpetration 
of “total war” – deliberate attacks on civilian populations, the commitment of a nation’s 
entire economy to the war effort, and the advent of “modern” warfare.  New technology 
both desensitized people to mass killing and made it more efficient.  Machine guns and 
long-range artillery, for example, transformed the limited wars of the nineteenth century 
into a war of attrition at the turn of the twentieth century with millions of soldiers fighting 
for both the Entente and Central Powers.  As industrial and economic capacity began to 
play a more vital role in “modern” warfare, so too did science.  Fritz Haber developed 
chemical weapons for Germany in 1914.  Escalation on both sides led to the increased 
killing potential of these chemical agents.  The intersection of science, industry, and war 
continued into World War II.  The Axis and the Allies terrorized civilian and soldier alike 
with new tools of violence like bombers, tanks, and rockets.  However, scientists brought 
weapons of mass-destruction (WMDs) – chemical, biological, and nuclear – into 
existence for the sake of victory.  The Japanese were the first to utilize WMDs during 
their invasion of China.  U.S. president Harry Truman unleashed the force of nuclear 
weapons against the Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, decimating the 
cities and their populations.  British Prime Minister Winston Churchill possessed both 
biological and chemical weapons and intended to use them against Nazi Germany on 
several different occasions.  Had the invasion at Normandy been unsuccessful, the Prime 
Minister would have doused Nazi-occupied territory in anthrax.  Likewise, Churchill 
wanted to retaliate against German V-1 and V-2 rocket attacks with chemical warfare.  
Most notably, Adolf Hitler did not deploy Nazi Germany’s cache of chemical weapons.  
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German scientists developed nerve agents in 1936.  Previously, chemical agents maimed 
many soldiers in World War I, but did not cause a significant number of deaths.  Yet, 
nerve agents were extremely lethal and could kill victims within minutes.  With Werner 
Heisenberg’s failure to build a nuclear bomb, these nerve agents – tabun, sarin, and 
somar – were the only WMDs that Hitler possessed.  Even when faced with the collapse 
of the Third Reich, the Nazi dictator did not initiate chemical warfare in World War II. 
 Hitler’s decision not to deploy his arsenal of chemical weapons was puzzling.  
According to historian Annie Jacobsen, the 12,000-ton German supply of tabun was 
enough to annihilate the urban population of London.  Despite the decline of the 
Luftwaffe, the Führer still potentially possessed the means to deliver his nerve agents with 
V-2 rockets.  Hitler’s worldview and his conduct of World War II would lead one to 
expect the dictator’s inclination toward initiating chemical warfare.  From his formative 
years in Vienna and through his adult life, he developed a worldview based on racial 
foundations that advocated violence and terror to achieve his goals.  Hitler’s anti-
Semitism became especially radicalized with the “stab in the back” myth at the 
conclusion of World War I.  He led the NSDAP to prominence in the Weimar Republic, 
and upon the Nazi Party’s ascension to power, gradually transformed his ideals into 
reality.  For the sake of the Lebensraum, Hitler invaded Poland, thus instigating World 
War II.  The German dictator believed in his messianic mission and murdered millions of 
European Jews with the “cleansing” policies of the Holocaust. 
 During the first years of the war from 1939-1941, chemical weapons were not a 
realistic option for Hitler.  Blitzkrieg tactics had led to the successful conquest of much of 
continental Europe.  However, by December 1941 and into the spring offensive of 1942, 
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Operation Barbarossa stalled due to the logistical issues created by the vastness of the 
Soviet Union.  Against the advice of his general staff, Hitler decided to split his invasion 
force to attack both Stalingrad and Leningrad before marching on Moscow.  However, 
the Wehrmacht became bogged down in the siege of Leningrad and in the urban building-
to-building warfare of the Battle of Stalingrad.  Clearly, Hitler’s worldview, his 
perpetration of the Holocaust, and the treatment of Soviet civilians and soldiers would 
lead one to believe that for the sake of his messianic mission, the German dictator would 
not hesitate to utilize chemical weapons to overcome these obstacles.  Therefore, some 
external element factored into Hitler’s decision to abstain from deploying his chemical 
weapons, even up until the ultimate failure of Operation Barbarossa in 1943. 
 Winston Churchill, the right Prime Minister in Great Britain’s desperate hour of 
need, served as a deterrent to Hitler’s designs in Eastern Europe.  Churchill threatened 
German cities with massive retaliation of bombardment with chemical weapons if the 
Führer engaged in chemical warfare against the Soviet Union.  Perhaps traumatized by 
his own experience with gas in World War I, Hitler did not want his people exposed to 
the same suffering.  However, certain logistical issues also may have affected his 
decision.  For example, by 1943, the Luftwaffe was crippled by the RAF in the Battle of 
Britain and spread thinly in support of the Wehrmacht in North Africa and the Soviet 
Union.  Thus, the Luftwaffe was unable to defend against the British.  In fact, from 1942 
until the end of the war, unrestricted British and American bombing campaigns ravaged 
German cities with little to no resistance by the German military.  Ultimately, Hitler did 
not believe that the Third Reich was in a situation desperate enough to risk the lives of 
his civilians and gamble with chemical warfare. 
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 However, by the summer of 1944, when the Allies assaulted Nazi Germany on all 
sides from France, Italy, and Eastern Europe, Hitler attempted several last-ditch efforts to 
check the Allied advance.  One was the Ardennes Offensive, which resulted in the 
Wehrmacht’s “last stand.”  This gamble, of course, did not pay off.  Second was Hitler’s 
faith in his “secret weapons.”  The nerve agents fell under this category.  However, none 
of these, especially the V-1 or V-2 rockets, had an effect significant enough to change the 
course of World War II.  Interestingly, the German dictator threw whatever he had 
available in his arsenal at the Allies.  However, in the final stages of the war, chemical 
weapons remained conspicuously absent.  Previously, Hitler was concerned with the 
preservation of the “Aryan” race, but as the war decisively turned against Germany, his 
thoughts began to shift towards suicide and destruction.  Hitler believed that the German 
people deserved extinction for their failure in World War II.  Indeed, his Nero Decree of 
March 1945 was indicative of these suicidal tendencies.  Engaging in chemical warfare 
and incurring Allied retaliation would have made sense.  However, architect turned 
Armaments Minister Albert Speer obstructed the Nero Decree and played an important 
role in preventing Hitler from deploying his chemical weapons.  Speer shut down the 
chemical weapons program and denied the Führer his WMDs.  Another factor stemmed 
from the Allies capturing the V-2 rocket launching sites in the Netherlands.  The 
Germans retreated east with their rockets so the technology did not fall into Allied hands.  
However, the V-2 rockets could no longer reach London.  Inside his bunker, Hitler grew 
apathetic and essentially abandoned the Third Reich to its fate.  His subordinates, unable 
to work together, instead sought absolute rule.  The state, the economy, and the military 
	   82	  
were in chaos.  Hitler’s chemical super weapons therefore did not appear on the 
battlefield in World War II. 
 Often overlooked is the destruction and death caused by the Allies during the 
closing years of the war.  The main focus has been on Hitler’s crimes against humanity 
with Nazi Germany’s perpetration of the Holocaust.  Both the Allies and the Axis carried 
out acts of extreme violence.  The legacy of violence did not end with Hitler’s suicide 
and the conclusion of World War II.  Under “Operation Paperclip,” the American 
government, covertly smuggled Nazi scientists into the United States to continue their 
research.  With the looming Cold War, President Truman and the American government 
wanted to prevent German scientific expertise from falling into Soviet hands.  War is a 
dangerous extension of escalation – one that results in the tragic deaths of thousands of 
non-combatants, especially in the era of modernity, industry, and science.  Dictators, 
governments, and militaries use all forms of justification to pursue policies of death and 
destruction.  Furthermore, WMDs continue to present issues of international contention.  
For example, Iran’s nuclear program has been a recurring hot-button issue.  Likewise, 
Bashar Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons against Syrian rebels took center stage 
on the international scene.  The United Nations, international organizations, and 
international agreements perhaps do not hold the final solution to controlling WMDs and 
preventing violence.  The question remains as how to end the cycle of violence and war 
and prevent the senseless death of innocent people caught in the crossfire. 
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